Why Truman Dropped the Bomb

[oat_soda]

one thing i love about the catholic morality is that it is simple, and also very deep. simple in the sense that most people would agree with its foundations because it is based on first things. like, the intentional killing of an innocent life is wrong no matter what the intent was. simply said, the end can’t justify the means.

for instance, instinct or conscience tells most of us that it was morally wrong to drop atomic bombs on these two cities. but, when people want to believe that it was right, they go into long discussions and confusing arguments to justify it. i’ve had the same experiance with anglicans justifing what henry 8th did.

the devil likes to take something perfectly intelligible, like the fifth commandment which is inscribed in our hearts, and try to show that even the law’s of God are really gray. this relativism leads to licentiousness.

2314 "Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation."109 A danger of modern warfare is that it provides the opportunity to those who possess modern scientific weapons especially atomic, biological, or chemical weapons - to commit such crimes.

i think reasonable people would admitt that the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki would fit the criteria of **“indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants”. **and that this was written in Gaudim et Spes in reaction to this act. even recently the USCCB compared this act to terrorism, something that no one here would argue is morally aceptable. i think we need to read more of the writings of JPII of blessed memory and less of what military historians think.

**Terrorist **attacks, like the “total war” exemplified by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, result in “indiscriminate destruction and death to civilians and soldiers alike,” he said.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

Originally Posted by vern humphrey
Absolutely. Munitions factories are a much higher payoff target in military terms. Farms are difficult to attack, and you get basically the same effect by attacking the transportation system, preventing foodstuffs from being moved to the military. Since you will attack the transportation system for other reasons, this is essentially a freebie.
john doran:

but we’re talking about the use of nuclear ordnance here, right? at that point distinctions based on “difficulty” of attack presumably become moot, since it takes as little effort to turn farmland into glass with a nuke as it does a whole city.

Does this really address Vern’s reference to higher payoff?

Cost benefit:

Given that cost = k, then benefit is

a) in the case of nuking farmland, the density of food and people complicit in supplying the military in farmland = ?

b) in the case of nuking a city, the density of munititions and people complicit in supplying the militiary in a city = ?

Benefit is higher, for a given cost, in the case of nuking a city. However, all this is turned upside down if the munitions manufacturing facilities are embedded in farmland.

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

Well, then take another look at what you said. You reduced the spirit of the discussion into a factitious oversimplication.

it was one way of understanding the implications of your comments, so i could say the same thing to you.

but there’s no need to go there, man - i didn’t mean anything by it, and that’s that.

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

Does this really address Vern’s reference to higher payoff?

Cost benefit:

Given that cost = k, then benefit is

a) in the case of nuking farmland, the density of food and people complicit in supplying the military in farmland = ?

b) in the case of nuking a city, the density of munititions and people complicit in supplying the militiary in a city = ?

Benefit is higher, for a given cost, in the case of nuking a city. However, all this is turned upside down if the munitions manufacturing facilities are embedded in farmland.

i am specifically avoiding a discussion of military tactics: the question is not what targets it makes most practical sense to destroy, but which targets may be destroyed morally.

as i pointed out to vern, it’s not good moral reasoning to avoid annihilating targets based solely on the pragmatics of destructive yield. it’s not bad moral reasoning, either - it’s not moral reasoning of any kind. it’s not a matter of determining whether or not targeting certain kinds of civilian center will actually hasten the end of the war, but whether or ot it’s permissible to target those civilians, perhaps even if the war would be brought to a speedy conclusion by their demise.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

oat soda:

one thing i love about the catholic morality is that it is simple, and also very deep. simple in the sense that most people would agree with its foundations because it is based on first things. like, the intentional killing of an innocent life is wrong no matter what the intent was. simply said, the end can’t justify the means.

The ends does not justify the means. The intent in bombing H & N was not to kill innocent life.
oat soda:

for instance, instinct or conscience tells most of us that it was morally wrong to drop atomic bombs on these two cities.

Argumentum ad populum.
oat soda:

but, when people want to believe that it was right, they go into long discussions and confusing arguments to justify it.

You may be confused by an argument. That is different from whether or not an argument is intrinsically confusing. The reasonable thing to do when an argument confuses you is examine the argumentation for logic, look at the reference material, and ask for clarity. What you have done is state an opinion, throw a quote at it, and then tautologize.
oat soda:

i’ve had the same experiance with anglicans justifing what henry 8th did.

Relevance? False analogy.
oat soda:

the devil likes to take something perfectly intelligible, like the fifth commandment which is inscribed in our hearts, and try to show that even the law’s of God are really gray.

Relevance? Verging on an ad hominum attack. Are you implying that those of us who disagree with you are demonic?
oat soda:

this relativism leads to licentiousness.

Demonstrate that our arguments are relativistic. Demonstrate that we are licentious.
oat soda:

i think reasonable people would admitt that the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki would fit the criteria of **“indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants”. **

That is your opinion. That is an opinion which you have not substantiated. And it is an ad hominum claim.
oat soda:

and that this was written in Gaudim et Spes in reaction to this act.

Then take the wording of Gaudium et Spes and apply each relevant claim to the act in question.
oat soda:

even recently the USCCB compared this act to terrorism, something that no one here would argue is morally aceptable.

Again, take the wording of the USCCB tract and apply each relevant claim to the act in question.
oat soda:

i think we need to read more of the writings of JPII of blessed memory and less of what military historians think.

Are you implying that we are not familiar with the writings of JPII and that this is the reason we disagree with you? Please refrain from telling us what we need to do. Being forthright with your own needs is infinitely more respectful.

 

[vern_humphrey]

john doran:

i am specifically avoiding a discussion of military tactics: the question is not what targets it makes most practical sense to destroy, but which targets may be destroyed morally.

as i pointed out to vern, it’s not good moral reasoning to avoid annihilating targets based solely on the pragmatics of destructive yield. it’s not bad moral reasoning, either - it’s not moral reasoning of any kind. it’s not a matter of determining whether or not targeting certain kinds of civilian center will actually hasten the end of the war, but whether or ot it’s permissible to target those civilians, perhaps even if the war would be brought to a speedy conclusion by their demise.

There is an interrelationship between the moral and the practical, however. The Just War criteria recognize clearly that the damage of the war must be offset by the harm avoided. Clearly, the practicality of neutralizing farmland must be balanced against the long-term effects, and the loss of life on both sides, and the overall impact on the war itself.

 

[john_doran]

vern humphrey:

There is an interrelationship between the moral and the practical, however. The Just War criteria recognize clearly that the damage of the war must be offset by the harm avoided. Clearly, the practicality of neutralizing farmland must be balanced against the long-term effects, and the loss of life on both sides, and the overall impact on the war itself.

i agree, more or less.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

i am specifically avoiding a discussion of military tactics: the question is not what targets it makes most practical sense to destroy, but which targets may be destroyed morally.

as i pointed out to vern, it’s not good moral reasoning to avoid annihilating targets based solely on the pragmatics of destructive yield.

And as I pointed out, there are not only practical but also humanitarian issues implicit in each option. I believe humanitarian concerns fall under the umbrella of moral concerns.
john doran:

it’s not bad moral reasoning, either - it’s not moral reasoning of any kind.

Well, let’s examine this claim. The practical considerations weigh the depth of our own resources against the benefits desired. If the benefit desired is to end the Pacific War and we throw away our resources on counterproductive endeavours, then we place at risk our ability to end the Pacific War.

Ending the Pacific War in 1945 as opposed to in the subsequent Spring had enormous humanitarian implications. During that winter, had the war continued, the Japanese would have starved and frozen to death. So in this case the practical and the humanitarian and the moral are knitted together.
john doran:

it’s not a matter of determining whether or not targeting certain kinds of civilian center will actually hasten the end of the war

Hastening the end of the war would have to be of benefit in practical, humanitarian, and moral senses. Ending the war for the sake of ending the war is not what is in question here.
john doran:

but whether or ot it’s permissible to target those civilians

The civilians were not targetted.
john doran:

perhaps even if the war would be brought to a speedy conclusion by their demise.

You are arguing ends-justifies-the-means. The civilians were not harmed in order to end the war. The civilians were harmed because the Japanese military was embedded in them and neutralizing the Japanese military would end the war.

Neutralizing the Japanese military did end the war. It is conceivable that the horror to which the civilians were exposed ended the war, but in fact it did not end the war. The military couldn’t care less about the civilians. Even Hiroshima did not end the war.

The belief among the Japanese military that they had been outraced at their own game ended the war. And that belief descended upon the military when the second atomic bomb detonated over Nagasaki.

 

[oat_soda]

That is your opinion. That is an opinion which you have not substantiated. And it is an ad hominum claim.

i’m just being honest and saying it’s my opinion only states the obvious considering i prefaced it with “i think”. i didn’t mean to hurt your feelings.

i stand by what the catechism says, and ultimately what my conscience tells me which is formed by the morals and doctrines of the catholic church. if my conscience is at odds with the teachings of the church, then i reexamine my position to see where i erred.

because you need to read it again

MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID NEW TRAGEDIES
Pope John Paul II*

August 6, 1995*

Once again I would like to recall the tragic events which, with the explosion of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 50 years ago, have dramatically marked our century’s history.

Weighing on humanity’s conscience like a nightmare, the memory of those deadly blasts of fire have become** the eloquent symbol of all suffering and destruction**.

But has humanity learned the sad lesson of those sorrowful events?

Today, unfortunately, I also have to share with you my deep concern about the tragic developments of the situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

It had been hoped that the latest negotiations in Geneva would have enabled bridges to be built on the way to peace. Unfortunately, words have given way to arms.

Let us pray intensely that no one will resign himself to this situation. May honest and persevering dialogue not be stifled by violence! Every effort must be made to avoid new human tragedies!

This is the prayer I address with you to the Virgin Mary, Queen of Peace.

**2314 **"Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation."109

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

And as I pointed out, there are not only practical but also humanitarian issues implicit in each option. I believe humanitarian concerns fall under the umbrella of moral concerns.

depends what those putatively humanitarian issues are; if you don’t want to annihilate enemy farmland in order to make available more foodstuffs for your own ailing army so as to minimize their suffering, then, though that may be a humanitarian concern, it is certainly not dispositively moral.
Ani Ibi:

Well, let’s examine this claim. The practical considerations weigh the depth of our own resources against the benefits desired. If the benefit desired is to end the Pacific War and we throw away our resources on counterproductive endeavours, then we place at risk our ability to end the Pacific War.

ok, i guess. but what’s that got to do with the morality of the means chosen to end the war? simply desiring an expeditious conclusion to armed conflict is insufficient to guarantee that the most “productive” route to that end will be simultaneously moral.
Ani Ibi:

Ending the Pacific War in 1945 as opposed to in the subsequent Spring had enormous humanitarian implications. During that winter, had the war continued, the Japanese would have starved and frozen to death. So in this case the practical and the humanitarian and the moral are knitted together.

perhaps. but even if you are right, this particular brand of practical morality you’re describing smells a lot like consequentialism.
Ani Ibi:

The civilians were not targetted.

i disagree. they were either (“proximately” or “circumstantially”) intentionally targeted, or the acceptance of harm to them was unreasonably accepted by the US.
Ani Ibi:

You are arguing ends-justifies-the-means. The civilians were not harmed in order to end the war. The civilians were harmed because the Japanese military was embedded in them and neutralizing the Japanese military would end the war.

again, i disagree.
Ani Ibi:

Neutralizing the Japanese military did end the war. It is conceivable that the horror to which the civilians were exposed ended the war, but in fact it did not end the war. The military couldn’t care less about the civilians. Even Hiroshima did not end the war.

The belief among the Japanese military that they had been outraced at their own game ended the war. And that belief descended upon the military when the second atomic bomb detonated over Nagasaki.

i disagree. but this is now an empirical game we’re playing that depends for its conclusion on the marshalling of historical evidence by each of us which i suspect that the other will simply find incredible; i can tell you that i find it spectacularly unlikely that the instantaneous wholesale destruction of entire japanese cities and most of their civilian inhabitants did not play a, if not the major role in bringing the japanese empire to its knees. i have no idea what would even count for me as proof that this wasn’t the case.

and i think that brings us to the end of the road.

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

if by “circumstantial” intention, you mean an actual, positive intent to harm the civilian populace, then that would seem to taint the whole act and make it simply and straightforwardly wrong; it doesn’t matter how “weak” an intent is, if intending is what colors the moral nature of an action.

but even if you just mean something more like “accepting as a side-effect”, the primary (i.e. intended) action can still be made morally unacceptable if the side-effects being accepted are accepted unreasonably. and that’s the argument made by at least some of those who argue that the use of nuclear ordnance is wrong, always and everywhere: that accepting the inevitable, incidental deaths of so great a number of non-combatants is inherently unreasonable.

jospeh boyle, germain grisez, and john finnis make a compelling argument to that effect in their book, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism.

Be careful here. It is moral under certain circumstances to take an offensive military action even if you know that some civilians will be killed.

For example, the man on the ranch next door is keeping a large group of family and friends inside his ranch house. He terrorizes them with torture, rape and murder. The police ring his house and prepare to assault it. He puts children by all the entrances so that they have to be killed in order to enter the house. You then believe that the man is killing the people inside.

It is now moral to kill a child in order to stop the man from killing them all.

Then there is the sniper who slowly kills other soldiers, but who hides behind a child as a human shield. If there is no other way, or if time is lives, then it is moral to kill the child in order to stop the sniper from killing anyone else.

Does this apply here? Maybe.

What everyone seems to ignore is that we warned the cities ahead of time, about what was going to happen. We gave them time to evacuate. Do you still thinks it’s immoral under these circumstances?

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

i would say that makes farmers and the manufacturers of ordnance morally identical.

You can’t possibly believe this. If you do, then the bomb manufacturers in Iraq are morally identical to the South Dakota farmer whose food ended up on the bombmakers table.

In certain circumstances, they could be morally identical, but not a blanket all-encompassing equivalence.

 

[qmvsimp]

oat soda:

i think reasonable people would admitt that the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki would fit the criteria of **“indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants”. **and that this was written in Gaudim et Spes in reaction to this act.

I am a reasonable person, and I don’t think Hiroshima and Nagasaki qualify as indiscriminate attacks. You’ve come to the crux of everyone’s disagreement.

I (and those who agree with me here), would qualify the choice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as very discriminate indeed. They were industrial centers where we believed arms and munitions were being made. They were selected as targets. The population had been militarized. Still, to settle our last moral qualms, we dropped fliers over the cities warning them in Japanese of one big bomb that would soon be dropped that would destroy the entire city.

I consider that very discriminate indeed, and not targeting civilians either. This is where our disagreement lies.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

oat soda:

i’m just being honest and saying it’s my opinion only states the obvious considering i prefaced it with “i think”. i didn’t mean to hurt your feelings.

I understand.

Let me say this about the civilian population. I will not argue that harming them was not good. No one really is arguing that harming them is good. Harming them was bad.

My point was to draw a distinction – a difference – between then and now.

Yes, it is a moral good to avoid war. In contrast to this, we must strive for justice. Since WWII we have developed many diverse diplomatic means to prevent war.

If we actually do engage in war, then the war of today is very different from 1945. The guidance systems of today allow the military to guide a bomb directly to a military target. Very very often this means that civilian ‘collateral damage’ is minimized.

One of the London bombers was captured not with guns, but with tear gas. I do not believe we had tear gas in 1945.

The casualties among soldiers are greatly reduced in our day compared to even Vietnam, say. So, I contend that the human heart has responded to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a human, connected, responsible, caring way. And this is good.

I do believe that Truman and the Americans did do the very best they could given what they knew then and what resources they had then. Now that we know better, we will do better.

JPII holds out that every life is important. And this is good. But his meaning, his rationale is not always on the surface. His meaning comes from the heart.

For example, he talks about apologizing to the Jewish people for the Shoa. Does this mean that he holds us responsible for those 6 million deaths? No. Does this mean that he holds Pope Pius XII responsible for aiding and abetting the Nazis? No, because Pope Pius XII did not aid and abet the Nazis.

What JPII means is that, even if only one Jew died in the camps, it is a wrenching tragedy. And as a human connected to that one Jew, JPII feels a tremendous loss – and the helplessness associated with that loss.

Schindler expresses the same sentiment at the end of the war. Having saved huge numbers of Jews from the death camps, he weeps and says he wanted to save more.

We want to save them all. But we are human and must live on this planet among other humans each of whom has free will.

We grow and develop as individuals. But we grow and develop as a human community as well. That is what history is about. Change over time. For Christians, that change is sanctification.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

and i think that brings us to the end of the road.

Yep.

 

[Philip_P]

Ani, on your claim that killing civilians was not a primary intent, I have countered this by pointing out that the destruction of everything in the target area is essential to the nature of an atomic bomb, so that if the target area includes civilians, their death is a proximate (essential) intent and not circumstantial. Claiming that it is only the overall object of winning the war that counts, and not the nature of the bomb itself, is a nifty magic trick to make the bomb morally invisible, but not a valid argument. However, as you have previously mentioned that you simply have not had time to respond to this yet, I’ll simply await your response on this matter while we focus on other matters.

In post 436 (holy cow, that’s a lot of posts!) you do address the slippery slope problem which I fear your definition of “combatant” raises:

Ani:

This is a slippery slope. The reasons I made the distinction between munitions manufacturers and farmers/cooks were:

1. to draw attention to the necessarily morally compromised position of munitions manufacturers at all times during the time war. End result: the munitions manufacturers themselves are fair game. No supplies = no army.
2. to draw attention to the practical difficulties of scorched earth warfare. End result: take out the bridges and roads and leave the farmers to their farms and the cooks to their noodles. No supplies = no army.

The munitions manufacturers were not potentially complicit. They were complicit. Some of the farmers/cooks may or may not have been complicit also. This reality has no bearing on whether or not to destroy the munitions supply.

Unfortunately, this attempt to avoid the slippery slope fails. You cannot claim that the a Japanese woman who worked at the munitions factory this afternoon but is now sleeping at home is actually, rather than merely potentially, complicit, while at the same time saying that the farmer is not also complicit. Either they are both *actively *complicit, or neither is.

The farmer may decide that tomorrow he will go to work in the bomb factory. Tomorrow, then, he becomes a munitions worker, and so under your formulation is now a combatant. Yet the same case applies to the Japanese woman who is currently asleep. Tomorrow, from 9 – 5, she may well be a munitions worker, but now, at this moment, she is no more a munitions worker than the farmer is.

It is true that in the past she *was *a munitions worker. In that case, though, we are no longer dealing with an aggressor or threat, but have moved into the realm of justice. You cannot sentence her to death by atomic bombing for past complicity any more than you may walk down the street and shoot a sleeping man for past crimes. Any action taken on behalf of justice at this point is subject to due process (which applies, but probably cannot be implemented until after the war concludes. Among the many crimes committed by an unjust aggressor who instigates a war is that he prevents the carrying out of due process).

The right of self defense, which legitimizes the use of force, applies to *current *aggressors, not past or future one.

 

[john_doran]

qmvsimp:

Be careful here. It is moral under certain circumstances to take an offensive military action even if you know that some civilians will be killed.

sure. but “knowing that civilians will be killed” is not the same thing as "intending that civilians will be killed.

and that’s my point.

qmvsimp:

What everyone seems to ignore is that we warned the cities ahead of time, about what was going to happen. We gave them time to evacuate. Do you still thinks it’s immoral under these circumstances?

we haven’t ignored this point: read the last 10 posts in this thread.

it’s not whether the japanese were warned of the impending bomb-drop - it’s whether or not it was reasonable for the allies to believe that the civilians would actually have managed to evacuate the premises by the time the nuke was released.

i mean, if you “warn” a guy who’s tied to a chair that you’re going to be shooting a bullet right where he’s sitting in the next 5 minutes, so he should get away, do you really believe that you’re absolved from culpability for killing him with your gun 5 minutes later when he’s still tied to that chair and you pull the trigger?

 

[john_doran]

qmvsimp:

You can’t possibly believe this. If you do, then the bomb manufacturers in Iraq are morally identical to the South Dakota farmer whose food ended up on the bombmakers table.

In certain circumstances, they could be morally identical, but not a blanket all-encompassing equivalence.

no, i don’t. and that’s precisely my point.

if you read my posts again, you’ll see that i offer this argument as a reductio ad absurdum of Ani Ibi’s argument: if what he says is true, then this moral identity follows. and that’s absurd. ergo his argument fails.

QED.

 

[Philip_P]

qmvsimp:

Then there is the sniper who slowly kills other soldiers, but who hides behind a child as a human shield. If there is no other way, or if time is lives, then it is moral to kill the child in order to stop the sniper from killing anyone else.

No. You could aim at the sniper. Suppose you miss and hit the child instead - that’s double effect. Not necessarily morally culpable here.

Suppose instead you first shoot the child, in order to get a better shot at the sniper, and then you shoot the sniper. You have just murdered that child. This is not double effect, but two actions in a row - shoot the child, then shoot the sniper.

Apply to our case. Suppose you drop conventional bombs on the munitions factories, some go astray and kill civilians. You are not necessarily morally culpable for those deaths. Suppose instead you choose a weapon or method that by its very nature entails the death of all within the city (i.e. firebombing, carpet bombing, atomic bombing). You’ve just murdered thousand of noncombatants. You cannot claim you did not mean to kill the non-combatants any more than the man who first shoots the child before shooting the sniper can claim that he did not mean to shoot the child.

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

i mean, if you “warn” a guy who’s tied to a chair that you’re going to be shooting a bullet right where he’s sitting in the next 5 minutes, so he should get away, do you really believe that you’re absolved from culpability for killing him with your gun 5 minutes later when he’s still tied to that chair and you pull the trigger?

If he is prevented from leaving then it would be immoral to shoot him.

If the chair is being used in the war effort to make arms and munitions, and he is capable of leaving the chair, and it’s wartime, and you warn him in his native language, and you give him time to leave, and he has been trained in military tactics on how to resist you; then it would be moral to destroy the chair, without making sure whether he has left the chair or not.