First, it would be much less confusing if you didn’t interchange “RNA” and “DNA”.
Second, you appear to have changed the scenario. In my understanding of the original version of the scenario the virus’s DNA or RNA was not being changed, just used for a different purpose.
Retroviruses have RNA that writes DNA to a host cell using reverse transcriptase. Both are involved.
Third, this is dodging the point. Two completely identical objects can have different purposes, and therefore different final causes, proving that telos in not inherent.
There are different theories of final causes that differ in whether they are committed to unique final causes or whether a thing can have multiple final causes. I don’t think either position would lead to telos not being inherent. A final cause does not imply that the final cause
will necessarily be actualized, as opposed to some other actualization.
The final cause of a virus’s RNA (determined by its form, ie. what it is) is to lead to the virus’s reproduction. It may not actually succeed; the strand could be errantly copied to the cell’s DNA, and the cell could direct it toward its own reproductive advantage. The retrovirus has certainly not fulfilled its end; it would not follow that the retrovirus has
two ends, though, since only 1 was determined by its form.
Here’s an example: a contry manufactures weapons to use in defense of itself, should war arise. A terrorist organization manufactures identical weapons for the purpose of terrorizing the country- a very different final cause.
I agree, although the problem here is that we are now talking about artefacts, upon which humans impose their own ends, which are certainly contingent. (Although, in the example you give here, the proximate end of the weapons is to kill others in either case; whether it is moral or terrible to do so does not really change the nature of what the weapons are doing. One could even argue that the proximate end is not even that, but to launch projectiles. The moral quality of the action, I would hold, is attributable to the person acting and independent from the weapon they are using. But this is not all that relevant, since you might modify the alternative to someone using a rifle for some other purpose, say as a walking stick.) The Thomist would hold that the materials used to create the weapons still have the same natural final causes.
Another example would be a tree. A tree’s end is to grow. We could think of a couple situations in which a tree does not grow, however. In one case, I chop down the tree and use it for firewood. This has an artefactual bent to it; I am using the material of the tree for my own purposes. But the fact that I can do so does not imply that getting burned is an end of the tree. The tree’s growth is its end because that is what it does according to its form. Another possibility is that a tree grows over a patch of grass, which it kills by denying sunlight. It is growing and killing grass. But growth is still its actual end; the killing grass is not what it does according to what it is, but is an effect of its growth.
And for the third time would someone please respond to my argument for Idealism?
I have been away from the thread for a while so I just responded to a post on page #2. Where is your argument for idealism?