Free will and foreknowledge revisited

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Quick logical recap here (entering late, sorry), can I restate the argument thus?

X is true. X is an event which takes place at T2, namely S picks a daisy (note, S does not have to be a person).
T1 is before (temporally) T2.
Truth is eternal, there for if X is true at T2, then X is also true at T1.

If this is the argument, then isn’t the question why X is true, in the causal sense as pointed out in the previous posts? In order for S to be a “free” individual, all that is required is that the alternative “not-X” also be presented to S at T2, and the argument doesn’t ask that…
Perhaps if we change the event to X = S chooses to pick a daisy, but that implies a choice regardless of its “logical” necessity, thus necessity does not necessarily omit choice. So my question becomes, is S the cause of X’s truth? And if so, could S have been the cause of not-X’s truth, say in an alternate timeline like T2(a)? Note, T2(a) does not have to be real, only logically possible, meaning “not-X” existed, which it did since all events X have their logical antithesis not-X (part of the law of bivalence you mentioned).

For every X that is true there exists (logically, not necessarily in reality) not-X which is false.
In a temporal situation, X’s truth, while existing from all eternity, is not actualized until T2, and it is only then (T2) that the alternative, not-X, is actualized as false. Therefore, prior to T2, the truth of X vs not-X was not established in temporal reality.

Now, to bring in God, the outside observer to whom T2 and all points after and before (including T1) are actualized, X is true, but it is only true because all events at T2 are actualized - this is why it is so important to understand God’s nature with regard to time. Now if to God T2 is actualized, then to S also is T2 actualized for S is the actor in the event X. The distinction between S and God is that, barring supernatural revelation, for S only the events leading up to and at TZ are actualized, where TZ represents what we here in time call the “present”.
To summarize, God knows that X is true at T2 because at T2 S also knows it is true for S chose X rather than not-X. Clear as mud?
 
…bivalence necessitates determinism…
I will repeat my counterargument against (b) right here: if someone is unable to do otherwise than they actually do, then this directly implies that the locus of causal control is outside him. For if it were within him, then it would not be the case that he would have a personal inability to do other than he does.
See my post just before this one, I continue it here.
Now let’s say God speaks to his prophet E and tells him that X is true. As far as E knows, S cannot do otherwise for the event is foreknown; heck, make S herself the prophet! Eitherway, the individual has been blessed(?) with foreknowledge of T2. Any every moment before T2, if S has free will then she has the unconstrained ability to choose X or not-X. You will say that she cannot choose not-X, that she is constrained by logical herself!! But logic only says that X is true contingent on S acting at T2, it says nothing of the alternative propositions before her in the moments before the temporal actualization of X at T2. At T2, S will choose X; indeed she must; but NOT because outside-forces control her and omit free-will, not because someone else or even she knew the future. She must because she is constrained by the logic of a proposition that was/is/has always been contingent on her choosing X rather than not-X. In that sense, if at T2 she were to choose not-X, temporal reality and indeed God Himself would be faced with an unanswerable contradiction!!! Thus, it is logically impossible for her to choose not-X, not because she lacks the power/freedom/ability, but because Truth cannot be False - she cannot choose both X and not-X any more or less than God cannot choose both X and not-X. In that sense, S and God are both constrained with regard to the S’s choice by logic and the reality (or illusion, if you deny it) of time.
This issue of the law of bivalence is the source of that silly argument “Can an omnipotent God create a stone which He is unable to lift?” The answer is that the question itself contains a logical contradiction: omnipotence and inability.
Your question is similar, “Can a free S choose both X and not-X? If not, she is not free!” The answer, Not even God can choose both X and not-X as it implies a logical contradiction. If you do happen to believe that God is not constrained by logic, well that is AWESOME but I think my head would cave-in prior to my comprehending such an event. Then again, human wisdom is foolishness before God, no?
 
You are arguing that the agent cannot both choose X and choose Y, and cannot both choose X and perform Y. Bivalence only necessitates this result. This is not determinism.
The way you said it earlier, you made it sound as if the distinction is between (i) performing X or Y as caused by one’s own volition, and (ii) having the ability to do both X and Y (even if they are mutually exclusive options). I deny (ii), but I am not therefore obliged to accept (i). In fact, we should abandon anything resembling this dichotomy, for it’s far from the scope of the argument.

Let’s take the proposition, “Ben will eat a cheeseburger for lunch at 12:30.” At this point, right now, that proposition is either true or false. Let’s say for argument’s sake that it is true; at every instant approaching 12:30, that proposition will remain true, of necessity. Therefore, from now until the time I actually eat my cheeseburger, I could not have done otherwise – it was true that I would eat the cheeseburger at 12:30 from the time the world was created! This property (that all propositions are “set in stone” at the time of creation, if not “earlier”) applies to every single proposition, including especially every single proposition involving human choices. This is what I mean when I say that bivalence necessitates determinism.

Presumably, here is where you might attempt to distinguish between PAP and the locus of causal control, in which case you can make sense of what I said earlier: inability to do otherwise implies a totally external locus of causal control. For if the locus of causal control were within the agent (partially or totally – to whatever extent that the agent would be the ultimate determiner of one’s actions), then it would follow that he has some ability to do otherwise. But bivalence entails that he does not; therefore the locus of causal control must be entirely extrinsic to him.
 
I realize that many, many people have probably come across this argument and therefore deem it to be impotent because, well, it’s been around a while. That is generally how we humans deal with such arguments. We normally think that if some argument is common or hackneyed, and if it still hasn’t persuaded everybody of its veracity, then it can’t be correct. I am humbly asking that any readers please ignore the fact that the free will/omniscience argument has been visited many times in the past and look to this argument. It’s not anything special or distinct from older versions of the argument, but I am convinced that omniscience cannot be reconciled with free will. Consequently, I would like to see if anyone can prove the following argument to be unsound. It’s rather brief.

First, knowledge is defined as “true belief.” (I realize that there are many nuances in defining what knowledge is, and that it is most often defined as “justified true belief,” but for argument’s sake all that matters is that knowledge is true belief.)

Argument: If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.

Objections considered:
  1. God can know what we are doing without causing us to do them.
Yes, but causality is not the scope of this argument. This is whether or not we have the ability to do otherwise.
I don’t know if this has been addressed, but do you believe Adam before the fall had free will?

God Bless,
Michael
 
If everything you state here is true, it still doesn’t save the argument in the OP. You would be required to demonstrate that falsification of PAP necessitates that the actions of the person were not determined by outside forces. You have not done this. In fact, you didn’t even attempt to do this in claiming that causality was irrelevant to the issue.
If PAP is false, then the acting agent is unable to do other than he does.
If the acting agent is unable to do other than he does, then it cannot rightly be said that he possesses the locus of causal control, for if he did, then he would have some ability to do otherwise.

tdgesq;5457501The argument you presented is not yours. I mean said:
Actually, to tell the truth, I’m pretty sure that I came up with “bivalence necessitates determinism” on my own. It came to my mind when my philosopher professor was speaking of Aristotle and the “future sea battle” scenario, and how he denied bivalence solely for the purpose that bivalence denied free will (which is a petitio principii). However, I would not be surprised if someone else thought of it far earlier than I did (perhaps even Aristotle himself), for it does not seem like that novel or complex of an argument.

Also, I have written a paper on how moral responsibility necessitates determinism, based solely on an analysis of causal control. But I nonetheless believe this present argument to be valid.
 
For every X that is true there exists (logically, not necessarily in reality) not-X which is false.
In a temporal situation, X’s truth, while existing from all eternity, is not actualized until T2, and it is only then (T2) that the alternative, not-X, is actualized as false. Therefore, prior to T2, the truth of X vs not-X was not established in temporal reality.
I do not believe this holds up. We can talk about actualized possibilities, but not about actualized truths. If X is true, then it’s true whether or not the event has occurred yet; there is no distinction to be made between non-actualized truths (as if a proposition is true but could be false) and actualized truths (as if a proposition is true but could not be false). Truthfulness precludes “possible falsity” whether the event of a proposition has occurred (whether the proposition has been “actualized,” as you say) or not.

Also, regarding points that you made besides this one, I agree that we have the ability to do otherwise in a sense: I believe we do not have an absolute ability to do otherwise, but a counterfactual one (i.e. if our desires were different at a point in time). But this is straying from the thread. For now, suffice it to say that free will requires an absolute ability to do otherwise, which I believe is impossible.
She must because she is constrained by the logic of a proposition that was/is/has always been contingent on her choosing X rather than not-X.
This can hold up only if the choice has already occurred or otherwise been “set in stone” such that the agent absolutely cannot do otherwise at all times approaching the time that the choice is made. It is unwarranted to say that a choice at T2 is based upon the abiding truth of a proposition that is true at T1 because of the agent’s choice at T2, for why would it be true before T2 if it were based on an event occurring at T2? That removes the “otherwiseness” of choices; they must be undetermined (i.e. not “set in stone”) at every moment prior to the actual choice.
This issue of the law of bivalence is the source of that silly argument “Can an omnipotent God create a stone which He is unable to lift?” The answer is that the question itself contains a logical contradiction: omnipotence and inability.
Your question is similar, “Can a free S choose both X and not-X? If not, she is not free!” The answer, Not even God can choose both X and not-X as it implies a logical contradiction.
I am not asking if a free agent can choose both X and not-X, but rather, given that it is true at T1 that he will choose X at T2, if he has the absolute ability to choose not-X at T2.
 
So you believe God caused Adam to sin?

God Bless,
Michael
In the same sense that a God who creates everything ex nihilo is the creator of everything (which you agree with), yes.

Otherwise, you and I would both say that Adam is a secondary cause of sin and is thereby culpable. We would also say that God is not the author of sin.
 
In the same sense that a God who creates everything ex nihilo is the creator of everything (which you agree with), yes.

Otherwise, you and I would both say that Adam is a secondary cause of sin and is thereby culpable. We would also say that God is not the author of sin.
How is God the creator of everything and yet not the author of sin?

God Bless,
Michael
 
How is God the creator of everything and yet not the author of sin?

God Bless,
Michael
Good question. How is He?

The postulate that every effect must have a sufficient cause, and also that the effect is “contained” in this cause, is very elementary. Therefore, the evil that exists in this universe must itself have a sufficient cause, and this evil must be in a sense “contained” in the cause.

Seeing as God is the cause of everything, it follows that there is a sense in which evil is contained within Him. How does this work? I don’t know. But by no means is it a distinctly Calvinistic conundrum.
 
Good question. How is He?

The postulate that every effect must have a sufficient cause, and also that the effect is “contained” in this cause, is very elementary. Therefore, the evil that exists in this universe must itself have a sufficient cause, and this evil must be in a sense “contained” in the cause.

Seeing as God is the cause of everything, it follows that there is a sense in which evil is contained within Him. How does this work? I don’t know. But by no means is it a distinctly Calvinistic conundrum.
Can you explain what you mean by evil being contained within God? I’m not sure what you mean by that. 🙂

God Bless,
Michael
 
Can you explain what you mean by evil being contained within God? I’m not sure what you mean by that. 🙂

God Bless,
Michael
All causes must have their effects “contained” within them; otherwise the effect would be emerging out of nothing.
 
I also have another question, Confessor. David committed the sins of adultery and murder. So you don’t believe David freely chose to sin?

God Bless,
Michael
 
Can you give a concrete example or an analogy? 🙂

God Bless,
Michael
I think a good example might be a spring that has so many joules of potential energy can launch a ball that has so many joules of kinetic energy, while the kinetic energy of the ball might be less than the potential energy of the spring due to friction, heat loss, air resistance, etc., the ball will never have more energy than the spring.
 
So let me get this straight. God creates all of us, therefor he is responsible for how we interpret things. He creates someone who doesnt interpret the evidence of his existence to be enough proof. Then he gives them the most painful punishment you can imagine for all eternity because of this.
 
I think a good example might be a spring that has so many joules of potential energy can launch a ball that has so many joules of kinetic energy, while the kinetic energy of the ball might be less than the potential energy of the spring due to friction, heat loss, air resistance, etc., the ball will never have more energy than the spring.
:hmmm: I never liked Physics. That’s why I majored in History! 😛

Now how does this relate to God “containing” evil within Himself? I’m trying to make the connection.

God Bless,
Michael
 
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