How do we come to know things?

[JuanFlorencio]

Like most metaphysical term “material” is analogous. I say that the form is “material” in reference to the fact that (in the case of sub-human creatures) the form depends on the matter it is composed with for its very existence.

Properly, the term “material” applies to the substance as a whole.

However, neither the form nor the substance itself can be identified completely with the prime matter.

The substantial form is certainly there from the moment of conception. Otherwise the animal would not be a member of its species. That is a straightforward reading of Aristotle: every substance has a substantial form.

(I realize that Aristotle knew nothing about ontogenesis, and proposed a theory of progressive animation—he thought that embryonic development entailed several discontinuities—but it doesn’t take away the main point: once the creature begins to be a member of its species, it has the substantial form proper to its species. If we hold to the theory of progressive animation—which I don’t, because I think that modern science has demonstrated that it is untenable—then an embryo would undergo two generations-and-corruptions, not just one: the “seed” of the male would be planted in the female, and it would acquire a vegetative soul, and then only later on an animal soul. So there are two distinct substances, according to this theory: the seed, which grows into the vegetative embryo; and the animal embryo. Hence, the actual generation of the animal is only—in this theory—the very last stage. However, each substance in question would have its substantial form, which would change over to the successive one. Modern embryology convincingly shows that there is, in fact, no such discontinuity in embryonic development, so in fact the animal possesses its substantial form from the moment of conception.)

What I find unsatisfying about theories like vitalism is that, although they offer a genuine insight that was lost in late Scholasticism and Modern philosophy, they generally do not explain where the élan vital or similar things come from. They tend to remain on the level of phenomenon, without seeking the foundation (at least not convincingly or thoroughly).

I agree that Aristotle’s hylomorphism—much as I value it—is insufficient for explaining the drive of living things to attain their perfection. That is another reason why Aquinas’ theory of actus essendi (act of being) is important.

If you are fond of metaphysics, the “élan vital” is a very well developed metaphysical notion. The difference of it in relation to Aristotelian notions is the method to which it responds. While Aristotle sees in definitions his art and strength, Bergson finds them in intuition and description. Don’t ask Bergson to explain where the “élan vital” comes from. He was an intellectually honest man.

But if both Aristotle and Bergson seem insufficient to you, that’s fine! It might mean that you realize how their philosophies are just brilliant efforts to imitate reality: powerful but limited. Your dissatisfaction might lead you to create your own model. However, without any doubt in my mind, I can tell you in advance: no matter how profound it may be, it will be just another imitation.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Sometimes, “substance” (“essence”) refers to the concrete individual, taken as a whole. This is, if you will, its root or most proper meaning. The term “supposit” or “hypostasis” is used to signify this meaning.

Other times, we need to consider the underlying substrate (or subject) that is actuated by active principles (e.g., the accidents and the act of being). We also call that substrate the “substance” (the term’s etymology in Latin refers to that usage: sub-stare, to underpin or undergird) or “essence.” It is perhaps an unfortunate accident of history that for both meanings we use the same terms, but it is not entirely inappropriate, because the two meanings are intimately related. For this meaning, the term “essence” is often preferred over “substance.” (It certainly is for the essence/being composition.)

Both of my statements had in mind the second meaning of substance/essence: understood as a metaphysical principle, a “substrate” or “subject”:

Naturally, where there are substances in the second sense, there must also be substances in the first sense (supposits).

Note that each supposit (individual considered as a whole) possesses its own essence (substance considered as substrate/subject) and its own act of being (which actuates that subject). There is nothing resembling pantheism here.

Analogy is not an exclusive characteristic of metaphysical terms. Analogy is everywhere in our language. It is unavoidable. The mistake would be to believe, for instance, that analogy really applies to being as being ( Analogy implies similarity and difference simultaneously, but any “difference” is being; therefore, there is no “difference” concerning being as being). Analogy shows the way in which we, as intelligent beings, proceed. We simply find similarities and differences. To be rational only means to be relational.

On the other hand, you can go back to the first posts, where we were discussing about abstraction and essences “in the second sense”. No “correction” was needed.

 

[lmelahn]

Analogy is not an exclusive characteristic of metaphysical terms. Analogy is everywhere in our language. It is unavoidable. The mistake would be to believe, for instance, that analogy really applies to being as being ( Analogy implies similarity and difference simultaneously, but any “difference” is being; therefore, there is no “difference” concerning being as being). Analogy shows the way in which we, as intelligent beings, proceed. We simply find similarities and differences. To be rational only means to be relational.

On the other hand, you can go back to the first posts, where we were discussing about abstraction and essences “in the second sense”. No “correction” was needed.

It is true that analogy is everywhere, but sometimes analogy is a sign of an underlying reality. That is certainly the case with being (to on): all of the meanings refer conceptually to substance. But their conceptual reference to substance is a sign of an underlying reality; namely, that the accidents are inherent in the substance.

One difference between metaphysics and many other disciplines is that the very concepts it works with are analogous. For example, God is Being, an angel is a being, man is a being, dogs are beings, and even the barking of dogs is a being. They are beings in very different ways, and yet there is something in common—there is a “communion,” in Plato’s terminology.

As regards abstraction, when we apprehend a material being, we grasp its essence in the first sense. Aquinas aptly calls that kind of abstration abstractio totius, abstraction of the whole. Because we don’t have the intellectual prowess to grasp that essence all the way down to the minutiae, we grasp it only “in general”—as a universal. But we are apprehending the whole, not the essence understood as substrate.

Remember what I said in a much earlier post: we only get to the notions of the metaphysical principles as such by using a reasoning process. We know substances (essences)—in the plural—easily; we know substance (essence) as such—whether in the first or the second sense—only after a lot of study.

For example, we know dogs easily; it takes a lot of reasoning to recognize that they are substances, and that (in a slightly different sense) their substances are the substrates for accidents.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

It is true that analogy is everywhere, but sometimes analogy is a sign of an underlying reality. That is certainly the case with being (to on): all of the meanings refer conceptually to substance. But their conceptual reference to substance is a sign of an underlying reality; namely, that the accidents are inherent in the substance.

One difference between metaphysics and many other disciplines is that the very concepts it works with are analogous. For example, God is Being, an angel is a being, man is a being, dogs are beings, and even the barking of dogs is a being. They are beings in very different ways, and yet there is something in common—there is a “communion,” in Plato’s terminology.

As regards abstraction, when we apprehend a material being, we grasp its essence in the first sense. Aquinas aptly calls that kind of abstration abstractio totius, abstraction of the whole. Because we don’t have the intellectual prowess to grasp that essence all the way down to the minutiae, we grasp it only “in general”—as a universal. But we are apprehending the whole, not the essence understood as substrate.

Remember what I said in a much earlier post: we only get to the notions of the metaphysical principles as such by using a reasoning process. We know substances (essences)—in the plural—easily; we know substance (essence) as such—whether in the first or the second sense—only after a lot of study.

For example, we know dogs easily; it takes a lot of reasoning to recognize that they are substances, and that (in a slightly different sense) their substances are the substrates for accidents.

What is common between the being of God and the being of the barking of a dog?

What do Aristotle and St Thomas mean when they say that essence is finally reduced to the definition?

Why would the apprehension of a material being be called “abstraction”?

Concerning substance, if you had a way to directly know the underlying reality, you could say that analogy can sometimes be a sign of it. Otherwise, the concept of substance is just an imitation of something you experience, which by the way is “on the surface”.

 

[lmelahn]

What is common between the being of God and the being of the barking of a dog?

Strictly speaking, nothing. However, the barking of the dog participates in the being (esse) of the dog, and the being of the dog, in turn, is an image of God, who is Being Itself.

What do Aristotle and St Thomas mean when they say that essence is finally reduced to the definition?

To “reduce” something in Thomas’ language means to lead something back, or upwards, to its origin. The term “reductio” transliterates anagogé in Greek. (You might be familiar with the “anagogical” meaning of Scripture, which leads the reader “upward” to the mysteries.)

In a previous post, in which you provided a passage from the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I think I demonstrated that (at least in that passage) Aristotle does not, in fact, state that the essence reduces to the definition. Here is Metaphysics I, iii, 983a, 26-27, the passage you provided for me a while back:

τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὧν μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ διὰ τί πρῶτον).

And here is how it should be translated:

Causes can have four meanings: among these, we hold one cause to be the essence [or substance], or that which something is just because it is to ti en einai]. (For the “by which” ultimately leads back to the word lógos], but the “by which” is cause and principle.)

(Aristotle then goes on to list the three other kinds of causes: material, agent, and final.)

In other words, he is not saying that the essence is nothing more than the definition; he is, rather, asserting that it is a kind of cause, strictly tied to what he later on calls the formal cause.

Here, Aristotle actually gives his quasi-definition of substance (essence), which he develops in Book VII; namely, “what something is simply because it is” (to ti en einai).

(Note that the word “definition”—χῶρος—does not appear anywhere in this passage. The word that Aristotle actually uses is lógos, which in this context means “notion” or “concept.” But neither is Aristotle reducing the essence to its concept.)

Why would the apprehension of a material being be called “abstraction”?

That is what “abstraction” means (to St. Thomas, anyway). The term refers to the fact that intellect needs to extract (mentally) the intelligible parts of the thing that it knows (abstrahere in Latin; from abs—from—and traho, to drag or extract), leaving behind the concrete, material aspects.

Concerning substance, if you had a way to directly know the underlying reality, you could say that analogy can sometimes be a sign of it.

We can know a substance as a whole—substance in the first sense—because the substance itself acts upon our intellects. Whole substances are the easiest thing for us to know.

It is also relatively easy for us to discern the accidents, at least the most obvious ones—shape, color, and so on.

It is also not terribly hard for us to understand that the accidents belong somehow to the substance. I would not expect a child to use those terms (substance, accident), but I think even a child would be able to understand that relationship.

That is already enough information for a philosopher to say that there is an analogy, with a foundation in reality, between the accidents as beings (ta onta [plural of *to on]) and substance as being (to on).

I am not saying that it was easy for Aristotle to come up with it. But now that he has done so, it seems rather difficult to refute.

Otherwise, the concept of substance is just an imitation of something you experience, which by the way is “on the surface”.

Just a reminder that the concept of substance as such is different from the concepts we generate by apprehending particular substances. The latter are formed spontaneously by the interaction of those things with our intellects; the former is arrived at through reasoning.

However, the reasoning process does begin with our spontaneous apprehension of particular substances, when we begin to ask the question “what do all these things have in common?”

I would agree, however, that the concepts we apprehend from material things are a kind of imitation of those things, an imitation that they produce in our intellects (with the help of the agent intellect, to be sure).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Strictly speaking, nothing. However, the barking of the dog participates in the being (esse) of the dog, and the being of the dog, in turn, is an image of God, who is Being Itself.

Let’s clarify this first:

Strictly speaking, Imelahn, is the barking of a dog something or it is nothing?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

…“There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being.-But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.”

Now, it is clear from this text that Aristotle doesn’t believe that the whole reality is only one substance, but that there are many substances; however, in terms of “being as being”, what is the difference between one substance and another? On the one side, in order for the science of “being as being” to be possible, Aristotle needs that the term “be” possesses unity, but on the other hand he seems to feel as well the need to recognize a plurality of substances.

I think it is very important to notice the point of divergence between Parmenides and Aristotle concerning their notions of “being as being”: It is not clear that such divergence was due to a mistake that Parmenides had made; at least not yet.

We already know that it is attributed to Aristotle the thought of substances as composites of prime matter and form. So, we are close to the notion of “prime matter”. But for the moment, we would need to find out how does Aristotle arrive at the notion of “substance”.

The notion of substance was not an Aristotelian invention. As in the case of the notion of “being”, before Aristotle there were divergent opinions about what should be considered as “substance”. Here is what Aristotle says in Metaphysics , Book VII, Part II:

"Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical universe and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or others as well, or none of these but only some other things, are substances, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid.

“Further, some do not think there is anything substantial besides sensible things, but others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and more real; e.g. Plato posited two kinds of substance-the Forms and objects of mathematics-as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of sensible bodies. And Speusippus made still more kinds of substance, beginning with the One, and assuming principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and by going on in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and the other things come after them-lines and planes-until we come to the substance of the material universe and to sensible bodies.”

As is clear from what Aristotle said above, it was not evident to everyone that objects like trees, dogs, horses and others similar to them deserved to be called substances. So, we can deal with these kind of objects and become familiar to them in our daily life; but to know that they are substances is not evident. So, some reasoning based on certain criteria is required (but who should establish those criteria?). Aristotle says:

“Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what substances there are, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a substance capable of separate existence (and if so why and how) or no such substance, apart from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.”

 

[lmelahn]

Let’s clarify this first:

Strictly speaking, Imelahn, is the barking of a dog something or it is nothing?

It is something. Not, however, in exactly the same way that the dog is something. The dog is independent or “separate.” The barking is not.

 

[lmelahn]

The notion of substance was not an Aristotelian invention. As in the case of the notion of “being”, before Aristotle there were divergent opinions about what should be considered as “substance”. Here is what Aristotle says in Metaphysics , Book VII, Part II:

"Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical universe and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or others as well, or none of these but only some other things, are substances, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid.

“Further, some do not think there is anything substantial besides sensible things, but others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and more real; e.g. Plato posited two kinds of substance-the Forms and objects of mathematics-as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of sensible bodies. And Speusippus made still more kinds of substance, beginning with the One, and assuming principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and by going on in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and the other things come after them-lines and planes-until we come to the substance of the material universe and to sensible bodies.”

As is clear from what Aristotle said above, it was not evident to everyone that objects like trees, dogs, horses and others similar to them deserved to be called substances. So, we can deal with these kind of objects and become familiar to them in our daily life; but to know that they are substances is not evident. So, some reasoning based on certain criteria is required (but who should establish those criteria?).

I think the criteria that Aristotle used were pretty reasonable: substance should be something definite (tode ti) and separate (choristón—i.e., standing by itself, not an accident). I think they can be derived directly from our experience, even though it would not occur to everyone, obviously.

I think it would fair to say that Aristotle was the first to define, or describe, ousía as “what something is simply because it is.”

Aristotle says:

“Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what substances there are, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a substance capable of separate existence (and if so why and how) or no such substance, apart from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.”

Eventually, as I said in a previous post, Aristotle used those criteria to determine that the arché that the Ionian philosophers sought (Thales with his water, Anaximander and his “indefinite,” Anaximenes and his air, so on) cannot be identified with substance, because although such a principle would be separate (i.e., it would stand by itself) it would not be definite (not “this what”, not tode ti).

He also shows (and I think convincingly) that Plato’s ideas are not “substance” either, because, although they (according to Plato) are “separate” or subsistent, they also lack concreteness (tode ti), since they are universals.

On the other hand, “what something is simply because it is” works quite nicely: it is both individual (tode ti) and subsistent (choristón).

Note that Aristotle resolves the first notion of substance (the whole individual or “supposit”) into the second notion (the underlying principle in which the accidents reside).

 

[lmelahn]

I think the criteria that Aristotle used were pretty reasonable: substance should be something definite (tode ti) and separate (choristón—i.e., standing by itself, not an accident). I think they can be derived directly from our experience, even though it would not occur to everyone, obviously.

I think it would fair to say that Aristotle was the first to define, or describe, ousía as “what something is simply because it is.”

Eventually, as I said in a previous post, Aristotle used those criteria to determine that the arché that the Ionian philosophers sought (Thales with his water, Anaximander and his “indefinite,” Anaximenes and his air, so on) cannot be identified with substance, because although such a principle would be separate (i.e., it would stand by itself) it would not be definite (not “this what”, not tode ti).

He also shows (and I think convincingly) that Plato’s ideas are not “substance” either, because, although they (according to Plato) are “separate” or subsistent, they also lack concreteness (tode ti), since they are universals.

On the other hand, “what something is simply because it is” works quite nicely: it is both individual (tode ti) and subsistent (choristón).

Note that Aristotle resolves the first notion of substance (the whole individual or “supposit”) into the second notion (the underlying principle in which the accidents reside).

This is also, incidentally, an implicit proof of hylomorphism: the arché lacks definition because it lacks form; the universal (Platonic idea) lacks definition because it lacks matter. In order to have a complete (material) substance, you need both.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

It is something. Not, however, in exactly the same way that the dog is something. The dog is independent or “separate.” The barking is not.

Is gold a “mineral” in the same sense as edenite is a “mineral”? Yes.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about gold is applicable to edenite? No.

Is your pine tree a “plant” in the same sense as a snowdrop is a “plant”? Yes.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about a pine tree is applicable to a snowdrop? No.

Is a horse an “animal” in the same sense as a butterfly is an “animal”? Yes.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about a horse is applicable to a butterfly? No.

Is a dog a “being” in the same sense as its barking is a “being”? Exactly in the same sense.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about a dog is applicable to its barking? No.

It is supposed that Aristotle wanted to study reality, but in many occasions he relies on what people use to say (though not any saying, but those that better fit his opinions): “substance” is said in many ways; “one” is said in many ways; “being” is said in many ways… And instead of asking himself, “why is it so?”, he just chooses it as his starting point (though, of course, he rejects those ways of saying that do not fit his opinions).

There is no possible analogy concerning “being as being”; it makes absolutely no sense to say there is.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I think the criteria that Aristotle used were pretty reasonable: substance should be something definite (tode ti) and separate (choristón—i.e., standing by itself, not an accident). I think they can be derived directly from our experience, even though it would not occur to everyone, obviously.

I think it would fair to say that Aristotle was the first to define, or describe, ousía as “what something is simply because it is.”

Eventually, as I said in a previous post, Aristotle used those criteria to determine that the arché that the Ionian philosophers sought (Thales with his water, Anaximander and his “indefinite,” Anaximenes and his air, so on) cannot be identified with substance, because although such a principle would be separate (i.e., it would stand by itself) it would not be definite (not “this what”, not tode ti).

He also shows (and I think convincingly) that Plato’s ideas are not “substance” either, because, although they (according to Plato) are “separate” or subsistent, they also lack concreteness (tode ti), since they are universals.

On the other hand, “what something is simply because it is” works quite nicely: it is both individual (tode ti) and subsistent (choristón).

Note that Aristotle resolves the first notion of substance (the whole individual or “supposit”) into the second notion (the underlying principle in which the accidents reside).

Precisely what follows is Aristotle’s review of the different ways in which “substance” is said and the selection he made.

For those who believe that for Aristotle “substance” and “nature” are synonymous, you can see his own words above: “we must first sketch the nature of substance” which obviously indicates that they were not synonymous to him (though, it would not be strange to find out that besides saying that “substance is said in many ways” he says -I don’t know if he actually does- that “nature is said in many ways” too. If it is the case, it would not be impossible that in one of those ways, “nature” would have the same meaning as “substance”).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

This is also, incidentally, an implicit proof of hylomorphism: the arché lacks definition because it lacks form; the universal (Platonic idea) lacks definition because it lacks matter. In order to have a complete (material) substance, you need both.

Imelahn, I guess you want to make some correction on this comment. It is quite common that in an interaction the elements that interact give place to something new, like when hydrogen (a combustible) and oxygen (an oxidizer) give place to water, which can be used as a quencher. But two concepts (like “prime matter” and “form”) give place to nothing by themselves; you need to create a result with your imagination. Then, if your imagination is strong enough, you always can make that those two indefinites produce something definite. However, whatever you can produce with your imagination proves nothing about hylomorphism.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So, Aristotle said:

"Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what substances there are, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a substance capable of separate existence (and if so why and how) or no such substance, apart from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.

And in the same Book VII, part I, he had said:

“*THERE are several senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;’ for in one sense the ‘being’ meant is ‘what a thing is’ or a ‘this’, and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that which ‘is’ primarily is the ‘what’, which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘three cubits long’, but ‘a man’ or 'a ‘god’. And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. And so one might even raise the question whether the words ‘to walk’, ‘to be healthy’, ‘to sit’ imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; for we never use the word ‘good’ or ‘sitting’ without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also is. Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance.” *

“*Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet substance is first in every sense-(1) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time. For (3) of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance. And (1) in definition also this is first; for in the definition of each term the definition of its substance must be present. And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or its place; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.” *

"And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense."

Somehow, Aristotle forgets to mention the sense in which Parmenides used the term “being”. So, now he only has to make his choice between a reduced number of options. And even though he knew that substance was said in many ways, he selectively uses the term to indicate the concrete individual. Therefore, everything is already set. What “must” substance be? It must “obviously” be something separate and definite (by the way, you will see that according to him “forms” are definite, not indefinite, which makes sense anyway). Nevertheless, he mentions in the last paragraph that the question “What is substance?” Is always the subject of doubt. Did Aristotle doubt? Do aristotelians have any doubt about it?

I have put in bold letters the sentence in which Aristotle says that substance is something underlying the “to walk”, the “to be healthy” and the “to sit”. My Spanish translation says that those determinations seem to be real just because they have a determined subject. To my taste, it sounds better. Just try to think on a “to walk” and the individual “underlying” it (I guess the “underlying” individual could be sitting himself while the “to walk” on “its surface” is walking). When I see this I profoundly regret not knowing Greek? I tend to think that the admired Aristotle was betrayed.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

What? No bold letters? Here they are:

…,And so one might even raise the question whether the words ‘to walk’, ‘to be healthy’, ‘to sit’ imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual)

 

[lmelahn]

Is gold a “mineral” in the same sense as edenite is a “mineral”? Yes.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about gold is applicable to edenite? No.

Is your pine tree a “plant” in the same sense as a snowdrop is a “plant”? Yes.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about a pine tree is applicable to a snowdrop? No.

Is a horse an “animal” in the same sense as a butterfly is an “animal”? Yes.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about a horse is applicable to a butterfly? No.

All of the examples above are simply species that are members of a genus. And every one of them is a substance—every one of them exists separately, not inherent to a substance. Hence it is not surprising that gold and edenite are “minerals” in the same way. This is a classic case of what the Medievals called univocity.

However:

Is a dog a “being” in the same sense as its barking is a “being”? Exactly in the same sense.
Does it mean that whatever is said rightly about a dog is applicable to its barking? No.

There is a big difference between subsisting (being independently, what the dog does) and inhering (being in something else, what the barking does). The dog clearly has more consistency than his barking. I can meet a dog in the street; I cannot meet barking (not without a dog to go with it).

It is supposed that Aristotle wanted to study reality, but in many occasions he relies on what people use to say (though not any saying, but those that better fit his opinions): “substance” is said in many ways; “one” is said in many ways; “being” is said in many ways… And instead of asking himself, “why is it so?”, he just chooses it as his starting point (though, of course, he rejects those ways of saying that do not fit his opinions).

There is no possible analogy concerning “being as being”; it makes absolutely no sense to say there is.

If—like Duns Scotus, Cajetan, and Kant—you consider “being” to be simply “existence,” the mere fact of being, then I could see why you think that. (Duns Scotus quite explicitly considered ens a univocal notion.)

But if you consider being (in this case, esse or to einai) a kind of act that admits of various degrees or intensities (as do Aristotle and Aquinas), then the analogy of being makes sense. Aristotle and Aquinas considered being (to on, ens) an analogical notion; for them being (to on, ens) is not a “genus” in the strict sense.

Aristotle analyzed the way “being,” “one,” and “good” (in his Nicomachean Ethics) were used in language. I think that was a reasonable starting point, since language is the external expression of how our intellects work. Language gets formed spontaneously, we don’t have to think about it, so it serves as a good “laboratory” for studying how our intellects work. From there, he could analyze how our intellects grasp reality.

Aristotle (even though he could be a little polemical) carefully considered the opinions of his predecessors. That also seems reasonable to me. When I read him, I do not find that he arbitrarily selects what his predecessors say, but in general offers very reasonable arguments for being in agreement or disagreement.

 

[Mount_Carmel]

We are not born ‘tabula raza’/a blank slate., we are born with innate curiosity and the ability to differentiate. It is interesting that even within our mother’s womb we develop a ‘linguistic’ and even an ‘accent’ bias in favour of those around - particularly our mother. The brain/mind interface is in constant action from the moment it has developed within the womb enough to do so. It is even claimed we generally come pre-packaged with some ‘genetic memory’.

 

[lmelahn]

Imelahn, I guess you want to make some correction on this comment. It is quite common that in an interaction the elements that interact give place to something new, like when hydrogen (a combustible) and oxygen (an oxidizer) give place to water, which can be used as a quencher. But two concepts (like “prime matter” and “form”) give place to nothing by themselves; you need to create a result with your imagination. Then, if your imagination is strong enough, you always can make that those two indefinites produce something definite. However, whatever you can produce with your imagination proves nothing about hylomorphism.

The imaginary concepts are the archai and the universals (ideas). There can be no arché (as the Ionians imagined it) because they did not consider the substantial form. There can be no Ideas (as Plato imagined them) because he thought of them as form without matter.

Real (material) things, on the other hand, are always composed of matter and form.

That does not prevent there being other kinds of composition, as in chemistry. But chemical composition is very different from the matter/form composition: each component in a chemical could stand by itself. Matter and form, no.

 

[Nixbits]

I hesitate once again to intrude for fear that my comment is tangential to the main discussion, but I’m interested by the notion of whether the barking of the dog has ‘being’ in the same sense as the dog itself.
Imelahn:

I can meet a dog in the street; I cannot meet barking (not without a dog to go with it).

One can encounter barking without encountering the dog that generated the sound. One can encounter a dog without encountering the two dogs that generated this dog. Both things exist for a finite period of time and both can exist without the continuing existence of the thing(s) that generated it.

The difference is only that one is composed of physical matter and the other is a disturbance of physical matter of which it is not itself composed. I’m not sure that this matches Imelahn’s distinction between the two:

There is a big difference between subsisting (being independently, what the dog does) and inhering (being in something else, what the barking does).

I don’t see how the barking is ‘in’ the dog. Once the sound has been generated it is an independent thing on its own.

 

[lmelahn]

Precisely what follows is Aristotle’s review of the different ways in which “substance” is said and the selection he made.

For those who believe that for Aristotle “substance” and “nature” are synonymous, you can see his own words above: “we must first sketch the nature of substance” which obviously indicates that they were not synonymous to him (though, it would not be strange to find out that besides saying that “substance is said in many ways” he says -I don’t know if he actually does- that “nature is said in many ways” too. If it is the case, it would not be impossible that in one of those ways, “nature” would have the same meaning as “substance”).

Be careful of your translations. The phrase W.D. Ross translated “we must first sketch the nature of substance” is as follows:

σκεπτέον, ὑποτυπωσαμένοις τὴν οὐσίαν πρῶτον τί ἐστιν.

which means

The first consideration is to form a rough sketch of what substance is.

Note that the term “nature” (physis) does not appear there.

Note that Aristotle does indeed identify physis with ousia. Have a look at Book V, which is basically his philosophical dictionary (around 1015a14).