How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[utunumsint]

has an existence that is received in something,
habet esse in aliquo receptum,

per quod ipsum esse contrahitur;
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted;

Just want to see what this translation looks like with some different meanings associated with contraho.

1-to draw together

[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself drawn together;

2-to assemble,
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself assembled;

3-to bring about
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself brought about;

4-to achieve
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself achieved;

5-to contract or make a bargain, to contract a debt
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted;

6-to limit,
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself limited.

7-to shorten, narrow, to depress, to incure (i.e. blame), to wrinkle
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself shortened? Narrowed? Limited? Depressed?; Blamed?, Wrinkled?

I think 3, 4, 5, and 6 are at least possible…

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

Here is the translation with the latin line by line.

God bless,
Ut

Just some thoughts

Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est,
For it is obvious that the first being, which is God,

est actus infinitus,
is infinite act,

utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem,
as having in itself the entire fullness of being,

non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei.
[Instance 1]not contracted to any generic or specific nature.

It would seem that what Aquinas is getting at here is that “first being” which I presume (perhaps wrongly) is existence itself as in ipsum esse subsistens or that which subsists of its own essence, which can only refer to God (first being), cannot be contracted or “reduced” to a generic (as in animal or human, etc.) or specific nature (as in an individual of a kind) because fullness of being, aka existence, cannot be reduced, lessened or “contracted” in that way. Logically, it could not be both fullness of being and something less since that would be a contradiction.

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being,
Omne igitur quod est post primum ens,

because it is not its own existence,
cum non sit suum esse,

has an existence that is received in something,
habet esse in aliquo receptum,

“Everything which exists after the first being” must refer to anything that comes into “being” or existence, i.e., that which is created. Created “beings” cannot be their own existence so their being or “existence” (perhaps better named subsistence or that which is held in “being” by the first being) must in some sense be received. Being in this sense is not an “act” that is enabled by the created being itself, but a passive state enabled by the first being. Being is therefore “received” or perhaps mediated or “contracted” from the first being through the “form” of created things. The form being the receiving “entity” the act by the first being (God) that brings into “being” each created thing. Through its particular form, each created thing participates in existence but cannot be its own or give to itself its own existence, since only the first being can do so,

per quod ipsum esse contrahitur;
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted;

So the “something” that receives or participates in a passive sense in existence (perhaps form?) is that through which existence is itself “contracted” in the sense of mediated or even transmitted.

et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse,
and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing,

et aliud ipsum esse participatum.
and the participated existence itself is another.

This distinction between the “thing which participates in existence” and the “participated existence itself” is genuinely puzzling. He seems to be trying to delineate between the thing which is in being because it participates in existence from the “participated existence itself” which would seem to be that which “contracts” or mediates between the thing that participates in existence and existence itself as if these were two (or perhaps three) separated “things,” for lack of a better word.

 

[prodigalson2011]

In which St. Thomas explicitly refers to the creation of esse:

De Potentia Dei, ques. 3, art. 1, “Is God able to create something from nothing?”

I reply: One should reply that it must be held firmly that God is able to, and does [in fact], create something from nothing. To make this evident one should note that every agent acts to the extent that it is in act; this is why it is necessary that an action be attributed to an agent in the manner in which it belongs to that agent to be in act. Now a particularized [particularis] thing is in act in a partial manner [particulariter], and this in two senses: (i) by comparison to itself, for it is not the case that its whole substance is act, since things of this sort are composed of matter and form, and this is why a natural entity does not act with respect to itself as a whole, but instead acts through its form, through which it is in act; and (ii) in comparison to those things that are in act, since it is not the case that the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act are included in any natural thing. Instead, each such thing has an act determined to one genus and to one species; and hence it is that no such thing is an active cause of a being insofar as it is a being, but is instead an active cause of that being insofar as it is this being, determined to this or that species. For an agent effects what is similar to itself.

And this is why a natural agent does not produce being simpliciter, but instead produces being that preexists and is determined to this or to that, e.g., to this species of fire, or to whiteness, or to something of the sort. And because of this a natural agent acts by moving, and so it requires matter, which is the subject of the change or motion; and for this reason a natural agent cannot make something from nothing. By contrast, God Himself is totally act, both (i) in comparison to Himself, since he is pure act who does not have potency mixed in, and (ii) in comparison with the things that are in act, since in Him lies the origin of all beings. Hence, through His action He produces the entire subsisting being, with nothing presupposed, since He is a principle of all esse and of esse with respect to itself as a whole. And because of this He is able to create something from nothing; and this action is called creation.

And hence it is that in the Liber de Causis it is claimed that the esse of a thing is through creation, but that its living and other things of this sort are through being informed. For the causings of being are traced back without qualification to the first universal cause, whereas the causing of the other things which are superadded to esse, or by which esse is rendered specific, pertains to secondary causes, which act by informing, since the effect of the universal cause is, as it were, presupposed. And this is why it is also true that no entity gives esse except insofar as there is in it a participation in the divine power. For this reason it is also said in the Liber de Causis that a noble soul has a divine operation insofar as it gives esse.

There you have it, folks.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, Article 1, para 4 dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeSpirCreat.htm#4

"…First part omitted… For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body. "

Analysis

1."…For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature…"

The word " contracted, " means not limited by or to or circumscribed by a generic or specific nature.

2."…Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own…"

God’s existence or act of existence cannot be put into the nature of, or shared by any created creature. It cannot be limited to or " contracted " to the nature ( essence, form) of a creature.

1. “…so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one…”

This refers to God, it does not mean there cannot be beings which subsist through God’s creative and fecund power. But it does mean that such beings would not be self-subsistent. Their subsistence would depend on the continuous application of God’s creative power ( which is what Thomas and the Church both teach.)

4."…Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted …"

Created being receives an act of existence form God as its own and which is not God’s Act of Existence or any part thereof. It is received through their essence or form to which and by which it is limited ( contracted ). Its existence is contracted ( limited ) by its form.

1. “… and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…”

The nature ( essence, form ) has an existence which it has received and which is similar to God’s existence and, because of this similarity to its Creator, it is said to participate in existence. It is also said to participate in existence because each creature has an act of existence to which each beings own existence is similar, differing only in degree or perfection.

But the existence of the created being, though similar to the Existence of God, its Creator, is another existence. That is, it is different from God’s own Existence. The two are not mixed in any ontological way, they are different realities altogether.

In the same way humans can be said to participate in the existence of God because we are created in God’s image, we participate because our intelligence and will and spirit reflect the same Perfections of God, our Creator.

1. “…and the participated existence itself is another…”

The created essence ( nature, form) is distinct from its existence ( but Thomas explains in other places that the two are inseparable, they are unified in one being.

1. “…And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency…”

Created being is thus said to participate in God’s Existence because it reflects, or is similar to the Existence of its Creator. In the same way, a child reflects or is similar to its parents which are the cause of its " coming to be, " but not of its existence, which it gets from God ,and by which it can be said to participate in God’s own Being or Existence.

And the created being is related to its existence as potency to act, because its existence is its very act of to be.

End Part 1

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, Article 1, para 4

Part II
dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeSpirCreat.htm#4

Yet on the other hand if we use the terms “matter” and “form” to mean any two things which are related to each other as potency and act, there is no difficulty in saying (so as to avoid a mere dispute about words) that matter and form exist in spiritual substances. For in a created spiritual substance there must be two elements, one of which is related to the other as potency is to act. This is clear from the following. For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body. "

Analysis Cont.

8."… Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body… "

Thomas must be speaking of prime matter which he considers as pure potency. It has no actual existence separate from its form through which it receives existence. In actuality the whole being/substance/essence is created all at once as a complete being.

Summary. There is nothing in this paragraph, nor in the entire article which suggests that the act of existence of created beings is the Act of Existence of God. Indeed, just the opposite. And many quotations from Thomas given above have shown that God creates an act of existence for each created being. All one has to do is read them.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In which St. Thomas explicitly refers to the creation of esse:

There you have it, folks.

Absolutely. Well done. Very well done.

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est,
For it is obvious that the first being, which is God,

est actus infinitus,
is infinite act,

utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem,
as having in itself the entire fullness of being,

non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei.
[Instance 1]not contracted to any generic or specific nature.

It would seem that what Aquinas is getting at here is that “first being” which I presume (perhaps wrongly) is existence itself as in ipsum esse subsistens or that which subsists of its own essence, which can only refer to God (first being), cannot be contracted or “reduced” to a generic (as in animal or human, etc.) or specific nature (as in an individual of a kind) because fullness of being, aka existence, cannot be reduced, lessened or “contracted” in that way. Logically, it could not be both fullness of being and something less since that would be a contradiction.

But I think that ipsum esse subsistens must be something unique to God. In De Potentia, he presents this objection:

1. Being to which no addition can be made is being common to all things. Now if God is his own being no additions can be made to his being; and then his being will be common to all. Consequently he can be predicated of everything, and will enter into the composition of everything: which is heretical and contrary to the statement of the Philosopher who says (De Causis, prop. xx) that the first cause rules all things without being mingled with them.

Now, what Linux has been maintaining, and you as well, I believe, is that God’s esse is somehow the esse of all creation, yet somehow remains unmixed with creation. This objection presupposes the exact opposite. God’s being cannot be the being common to all.

THis is how Aquinas resolves this dilemma:

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Being to which no addition is made is universal being, though the possibility of addition thereto is not incompatible with the notion of universal being: whereas the divine being is being to which no addition can be made and this enters into the very notion of the divine being: wherefore the divine being is not universal being. Thus by adding the difference rational to animal in general we do not add anything to the notion of animal in general: and yet it is not incompatible with the idea of animal in general that an addition to it be possible: for this enters into the notion of irrational animal which is a species of animal.

Note how he distinguishes between universal being and divine being. Divine being is that which nothing can be added to. Universal being is similar to divine being, but it has this key difference. “Addition thereto is not incompatible with the notion of universal being”.

This fits what he says earlier:

Now all created causes have one common effect which is being, although each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are differentiated: thus heat makes a thing to be hot, and a builder gives being to a house. Accordingly they have this in common that they cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher than all other by virtue of which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this cause is God, Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds therefrom in likeness to its nature. Therefore being must be the essence or nature of God. For this reason it is stated in De Causis (prop. ix) that none but a divine intelligence gives being, and that being is the first of all effects, and that nothing was created before it.

So what you end up with is the following gradation:

1. 
   *]God the first being in which no addition can be made.
   *]God causes universal being - that which is like God in that it is the universal principle of all action in created beings, but is not incompatible with the notion of addition, unlike God. This intermediary is “The first of all effects, and that nothing was created before it.”
   *]Created essences contract being from this universal created being. The universal first effect of God.
   
   I want to see how this this fits with the rest of your response.
   

   Quote:
   Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being,
   Omne igitur quod est post primum ens,

   because it is not its own existence,
   cum non sit suum esse,

   has an existence that is received in something,
   habet esse in aliquo receptum,

   “Everything which exists after the first being” must refer to anything that comes into “being” or existence, i.e., that which is created. Created “beings” cannot be their own existence so their being or “existence” (perhaps better named subsistence or that which is held in “being” by the first being) must in some sense be received.

   
   Agreed, but the what I am proposing is that creatures receive their being from universal being - the first effect of God’s creation. Not directly from God.
   

   Being in this sense is not an “act” that is enabled by the created being itself, but a passive state enabled by the first being.

   Through the intermediary of universal being.
   

   Being is therefore “received” or perhaps mediated or “contracted” from the first being through the “form” of created things. The form being the receiving “entity” the act by the first being (God) that brings into “being” each created thing. Through its particular form, each created thing participates in existence but cannot be its own or give to itself its own existence, since only the first being can do so,

   I will accept this definition of “contracted” if that which is contracted is universal being, God’s first effect, and not God himself.
   
   continued -

 

[utunumsint]

Quote:
per quod ipsum esse contrahitur;
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted;

So the “something” that receives or participates in a passive sense in existence (perhaps form?) is that through which existence is itself “contracted” in the sense of mediated or even transmitted.

OK. But only if the existence that is contracted through a particular essence (form), is universal esse common to all, first of all God’s effects.

Quote:
et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse,
and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing,

et aliud ipsum esse participatum.
and the participated existence itself is another.

This distinction between the “thing which participates in existence” and the “participated existence itself” is genuinely puzzling. He seems to be trying to delineate between the thing which is in being because it participates in existence from the “participated existence itself” which would seem to be that which “contracts” or mediates between the thing that participates in existence and existence itself as if these were two (or perhaps three) separated “things,” for lack of a better word.

Right - but I think that the third thing - participated being - is that which mediates between the thing that participates in existence, and the divine existence: namely universal being, the first of God’s effects. It is being itself, but different from divine being because it is not incompatible with the notion of addition.

What do you think?

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Hi Peter,

Just as an aside, I think ProdigalSon2011’s previous quote resolves our problem about contraho.

In ProdigalSon2001’s quote, Aquinas sets up this comparison between God and creatures in so far as how they are in act:

Now a particularized [particularis] thing is in act in a partial manner [particulariter], and this in two senses:

• (i) by comparison to itself, for it is not the case that its whole substance is act, since things of this sort are composed of matter and form, and this is why a natural entity does not act with respect to itself as a whole, but instead acts through its form, through which it is in act; and
• (ii) in comparison to those things that are in act, since it is not the case that the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act are included in any natural thing. Instead, each such thing has an act determined to one genus and to one species; and hence it is that no such thing is an active cause of a being insofar as it is a being, but is instead an active cause of that being insofar as it is this being, determined to this or that species. For an agent effects what is similar to itself.

…
By contrast, God Himself is totally act, both:

• (i) in comparison to Himself, since he is pure act who does not have potency mixed in, and
• (ii) in comparison with the things that are in act, since in Him lies the origin of all beings. Hence, through His action He produces the entire subsisting being, with nothing presupposed, since He is a principle of all esse and of esse with respect to itself as a whole. And because of this He is able to create something from nothing; and this action is called creation.

He is distinguishing esse that is contracted by form. and that universal esse created by God “He is the principle of all esse and of esse with respect to itself as a whole.”

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

Not so. Esse cannot exist without being joined to some nature.

Assertion. First of all Aquinas has never said anything like that, secondly whether or not Aquinas thinks this is true is besides the point since it cannot be concluded metaphysically. By saying that esse cannot exist without essence is to reduce esse from the level of that which actually gives actuality to that which is mere potency; and also you subordinate esse to the essences which contradicts the fact that esse is that which perfects potency; which makes no real objective sense of perfection if it is not already an act in and of its self. Potency cannot perfect anything, which leaves only God as that which perfects potency.

Secondly your reasoning clearly results in denying a real objective distinction between esse and essence in creatures because if esse cannot exist without essence then esse is not a thing in and of itself and therefore not truly distinct from an essence, just like the three sides of a triangle is not truly distinct from the essence of a triangle. It makes the whole concept of esse being conjoined to potency objectively meaningless since esse isn’t actually a thing but merely an categorical abstraction describing one object in two senses.

The fact is only natures exist, and thus esse is either a nature in and of itself (which can only describe God - self-subsistent being) or it is nothing at all - it is a meaningless concept. Since we can see in creatures that actuality is a real distinct thing that is not intrinsic to the essense of that which is in act, we must therefore say that the act of existence is a nature in and of itself and is therefore identical to the concept of a self-subsistent being. Thus Ipsum esse subsistens is that which is conjoined to created essences since the essence of creation cannot exist otherwise and neither can potency be meaningfully perfected in act.

It does need, as its foundation and origin, the “Ipsum esse subsistens” that is God. God creates things, from nothing, with both of these principles simultaneously.

If we assume that esse and Ipsum esse subsistens are two distinct things, then a dilemma does surely arise since it is either Ipsum esse subsistens that perfects potency or it is esse that perfects potency. It cannot coherently be both. As i said, your interpretation of esse leaves it functionally useless and objectively meaningless.

As I have continually argued, and will continue to do so, the act of Creation is not a conjunctive act. It is performed ex nihilo.

I know you will continue, but your continuation is not based on metaphysical logic; and i doubt it is based on a genuine correct interpretation of Aquinas.

 

[Peter_Plato]

OK. But only if the existence that is contracted through a particular essence (form), is universal esse common to all, first of all God’s effects.

Right - but I think that the third thing - participated being - is that which mediates between the thing that participates in existence, and the divine existence: namely universal being, the first of God’s effects. It is being itself, but different from divine being because it is not incompatible with the notion of addition.

What do you think?

God bless,
Ut

I am not clear that Aquinas would hold that being can be created because being essentially is God.

Let me take another tack using the passage from De Spiritualibus Creaturis.

1. God as “first being” (having in itself the entire fullness of being) cannot be described as “having being” because God is “Being Itself” or simply “to be,” Pure Act (Actus Purus.) If God has the “entire fullness of being” then in what sense can other beings have being, except “in” that fullness?
2. Aquinas uses the example of whiteness as follows:

For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one.

What he seems to be doing here is showing that a “transcendent” property such as whiteness that is “one” could not be separated into “whitenesses” that inhere separately in different things but one whiteness that, in a sense, is apart from every subject and recipient.

I think Aquinas is here pointing out a problem with regard to existence or being.

He is demonstrating that if existence (esse) can be used in the same way as “whiteness” there is a problem. We cannot say that existence can be, like whiteness one “property” that can be used to describe existing things, as in, “Trees exist,” “Pianos exist,” and “God also exists.”
The reason we cannot do this is because we have already committed ourselves to a metaphysical claim. We do not claim that God exists in the sense that God has being, we have claimed that God is being itself, existence itself - the fullness of being, complete being in himself.

That would be like claiming, not that God has the property of whiteness, but that God is Whiteness itself. If that were true, then other things could not be “white” without sharing an aspect of God himself. Things could not “be” white, without, likewise, being God.

That is the quandary we find ourselves in when we, Aquinas included, hold that God is ipsum esse subsistens. God is not a being that exists, but rather the fullness of being, Existence Itself. Existence is what God is. He does not have existence, he is existence.

Whiteness, can be predicated of different things because whiteness is transcendent, it is an accidental quality that different things can have without affecting whiteness itself. Whiteness is an ontological accident. However, “being” is not a quality, being is what is, and “to be” means that whatever exists has being or “isness.” If that “isness” is God, then beings have God. There is no way around that.

The quandary that Aquinas is pointing out is that being (self-subsisting existence), unlike whiteness, cannot be one and, at the same time, many. Being cannot be parceled out or distributed in the way that whiteness can be because being is not accidental, it is essential. However, because God is existence itself, being itself, and not merely some other thing that “has being” then being is, in a sense, “reserved” to God.

So, how do we reconcile the fact that other beings “exist” with the fact that God is being itself? Aquinas is attempting to do exactly that in the passage. The question is: "How does he do it without compromising the divine nature, without compromising that existence is one?

Here is the passage again, which I think is crucial to Aquinas’ entire metaphysic and theology:

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body.
From: De Spiritualibus Creaturis - Article 1, Answer Paragraph 4

I think Aquinas is distinguishing between God who is existence in an “active” sense and creation that receives existence by participation or “contracts” it as mediated through form, which is the creative action of God that “forms” creation or gives it substance in the very act of creating.

Continued…

 

[Peter_Plato]

… From last

I would argue that Aquinas’ last phrase “as the soul to the body” gives a hint regarding how form actualizes creation in the universal sense.

If we go back a line to “…matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form…” I think what he is getting at here is the mediation between God’s Being (existence itself) and creation, wherein creation participates in existence, in the manner that the body is activated by the soul, is brought about or “contracted” through the Image of God, the Logos or Christ, through whom all things came to be.

Thus, to answer your initial question whether the mediation is through “universal” or “common” being, I would argue that even that would be a “passive” or receptive reality and could not be the active mediator required. I would argue the mediator must be Christ, the Active Word that goes out from the mouth of God, that actively “informs” all creation to bring it into being by participation.

This idea of “contract” also fits into the Old Testament notion of covenant where humanity lives up to the terms of “mediation” which enables each of us “to be” as fully as possible.

 

[Peter_Plato]

To clarify this statement of mine:

I am not clear that Aquinas would hold that being can be created because being essentially is God.

God does create things that have being, or “beings,” but God does not create being itself. That would be what God is.

 

[Linux]

I am not clear that Aquinas would hold that being can be created because being essentially is God.

Let me take another tack using the passage from De Spiritualibus Creaturis.

1. God as “first being” (having in itself the entire fullness of being) cannot be described as “having being” because God is “Being Itself” or simply “to be,” Pure Act (Actus Purus.) If God has the “entire fullness of being” then in what sense can other beings have being, except “in” that fullness?
2. Aquinas uses the example of whiteness as follows:

What he seems to be doing here is showing that a “transcendent” property such as whiteness that is “one” could not be separated into “whitenesses” that inhere separately in different things but one whiteness that, in a sense, is apart from every subject and recipient.

I think Aquinas is here pointing out a problem with regard to existence or being.

He is demonstrating that if existence (esse) can be used in the same way as “whiteness” there is a problem. We cannot say that existence can be, like whiteness one “property” that can be used to describe existing things, as in, “Trees exist,” “Pianos exist,” and “God also exists.”
The reason we cannot do this is because we have already committed ourselves to a metaphysical claim. We do not claim that God exists in the sense that God has being, we have claimed that God is being itself, existence itself - the fullness of being, complete being in himself.

That would be like claiming, not that God has the property of whiteness, but that God is Whiteness itself. If that were true, then other things could not be “white” without sharing an aspect of God himself. Things could not “be” white, without, likewise, being God.

That is the quandary we find ourselves in when we, Aquinas included, hold that God is ipsum esse subsistens. God is not a being that exists, but rather the fullness of being, Existence Itself. Existence is what God is. He does not have existence, he is existence.

Whiteness, can be predicated of different things because whiteness is transcendent, it is an accidental quality that different things can have without affecting whiteness itself. Whiteness is an ontological accident. However, “being” is not a quality, being is what is, and “to be” means that whatever exists has being or “isness.” If that “isness” is God, then beings have God. There is no way around that.

The quandary that Aquinas is pointing out is that being (self-subsisting existence), unlike whiteness, cannot be one and, at the same time, many. Being cannot be parceled out or distributed in the way that whiteness can be because being is not accidental, it is essential. However, because God is existence itself, being itself, and not merely some other thing that “has being” then being is, in a sense, “reserved” to God.

So, how do we reconcile the fact that other beings “exist” with the fact that God is being itself? Aquinas is attempting to do exactly that in the passage. The question is: "How does he do it without compromising the divine nature, without compromising that existence is one?

Here is the passage again, which I think is crucial to Aquinas’ entire metaphysic and theology:

I think Aquinas is distinguishing between God who is existence in an “active” sense and creation that receives existence by participation or “contracts” it as mediated through form, which is the creative action of God that “forms” creation or gives it substance in the very act of creating.

Continued…

I could not have said it better. Precisely (i love your analogy) if God’s esse was like being whiteness itself, then what logical sense does it make to say that other beings have their own distinct whiteness? Its a contradiction.

 

[Linux]

To clarify this statement of mine:

God does create things that have being, or “beings,” but God does not create being itself. That would be what God is.

I agree.

 

[utunumsint]

… From last

I would argue that Aquinas’ last phrase “as the soul to the body” gives a hint regarding how form actualizes creation in the universal sense.

If we go back a line to “…matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form…” I think what he is getting at here is the mediation between God’s Being (existence itself) and creation, wherein creation participates in existence, in the manner that the body is activated by the soul, is brought about or “contracted” through the Image of God, the Logos or Christ, through whom all things came to be.

Thus, to answer your initial question whether the mediation is through “universal” or “common” being, I would argue that even that would be a “passive” or receptive reality and could not be the active mediator required. I would argue the mediator must be Christ, the Active Word that goes out from the mouth of God, that actively “informs” all creation to bring it into being by participation.

This idea of “contract” also fits into the Old Testament notion of covenant where humanity lives up to the terms of “mediation” which enables each of us “to be” as fully as possible.

Hummm… my gut reaction to to this idea is that it potentially reduces Christ to form, and in so doing reduces him to “Image of God” instead of true God.

But I’ll think about this some more before committing myself to this knee jerk reaction.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

Hummm… my gut reaction to to this idea is that it potentially reduces Christ to form, and in so doing reduces him to “Image of God” instead of true God.

But I’ll think about this some more before committing myself to this knee jerk reaction.

God bless,
Ut

Paul seems to use very similar language in Colossians:

The Son is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together. And he is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning and the firstborn from among the dead, so that in everything he might have the supremacy. For God was pleased to have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross. (Col 1:15-20)

 

[utunumsint]

Hummm… my gut reaction to to this idea is that it potentially reduces Christ to form, and in so doing reduces him to “Image of God” instead of true God.

But I’ll think about this some more before committing myself to this knee jerk reaction.

God bless,
Ut

Thinking about this further,

God’s essence is existence, yes, but you have brought in the theological consideration of trinity. Father, only begotten son (word), and holy spirit.

The image of God in the Trinity, is the Word of God - the Son.

Now I agree that the Word is by whom all things were made. So in a sense, the forms must exist in the Word. But I think Aquinas would say, as Exemplars. Perfect exemplars, but not identical to the forms that exist in nature. I think Aquinas also distinguishes between existence that is in God that is subsistent and is unique, with existence as it exists in creatures. Creative existence admits to receiving addition. Although it is not in potentiality to form, it actualizes forms.

As to your point about only being one witness meaning that there can only one existence, we seem to be denying the very possibility of creation itself. If only God can exist, because only God’s existence is subsistent, then only God exists. Only God really is. But the Christian notion of God is that he sustains existence.

Note: I see your next post… I’ll look at that in a minute.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

De Potentia Dei, ques. 3, art. 1, “Is God able to create something from nothing?”

I reply: One should reply that it must be held firmly that God is able to, and does [in fact], create something from nothing. To make this evident one should note that every agent acts to the extent that it is in act; this is why it is necessary that an action be attributed to an agent in the manner in which it belongs to that agent to be in act. Now a particularized [particularis] thing is in act in a partial manner [particulariter], and this in two senses: (i) by comparison to itself, for it is not the case that its whole substance is act, since things of this sort are composed of matter and form, and this is why a natural entity does not act with respect to itself as a whole, but instead acts through its form, through which it is in act; and (ii) in comparison to those things that are in act, since it is not the case that the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act are included in any natural thing. Instead, each such thing has an act determined to one genus and to one species; and hence it is that no such thing is an active cause of a being insofar as it is a being, but is instead an active cause of that being insofar as it is this being, determined to this or that species. For an agent effects what is similar to itself.

And this is why a natural agent does not produce being simpliciter, but instead produces being that preexists and is determined to this or to that, e.g., to this species of fire, or to whiteness, or to something of the sort. And because of this a natural agent acts by moving, and so it requires matter, which is the subject of the change or motion; and for this reason a natural agent cannot make something from nothing. By contrast, God Himself is totally act, both (i) in comparison to Himself, since he is pure act who does not have potency mixed in, and (ii) in comparison with the things that are in act, since in Him lies the origin of all beings. Hence, through His action He produces the entire subsisting being, with nothing presupposed, since He is a principle of all esse and of esse with respect to itself as a whole. And because of this He is able to create something from nothing; and this action is called creation.

And hence it is that in the Liber de Causis it is claimed that the esse of a thing is through creation, but that its living and other things of this sort are through being informed. For the causings of being are traced back without qualification to the first universal cause, whereas the causing of the other things which are superadded to esse, or by which esse is rendered specific, pertains to secondary causes, which act by informing, since the effect of the universal cause is, as it were, presupposed. And this is why it is also true that no entity gives esse except insofar as there is in it a participation in the divine power. For this reason it is also said in the Liber de Causis that a noble soul has a divine operation insofar as it gives esse.

There you have it, folks.

( From ProdigalSon - proves that Thomas taught that the Act of Existence of God is not the act of existence of created beings. One may say he is wrong, but one may not deny that he taught it. Also, that created beings have their own act of existene would agree with Catholic Doctrine. It would be contrary to Catholic Doctrine to hold that the act of existence of creatures is the Act of Existence of God.)

Linus2nd

 

[Peter_Plato]

As to your point about only being one witness meaning that there can only one existence, we seem to be denying the very possibility of creation itself. If only God can exist, because only God’s existence is subsistent, then only God exists. Only God really is. But the Christian notion of God is that he sustains existence.
Ut

This is actually saying that creation is nothing (ex nihilo) without the actualizing power of God. Creation is “in being” to the extent that God enables it to be, otherwise creation truly is nothing. That is what ex nihilo means, I think.