Infinite regress

[Blue_Horizon]

I think the unmoved mover (First Way) and the uncaused first cause (Second Way) are pe se.

Except for the first cause, all causes are said to be ordered per se or essentially.

Causes ordered per accidens don’t depend essentially (for efficacy) on the earlier causes.

I think you’ve misunderstood and the last statement may not hold.
Chains of locomotion, if their is a final effect, obviously are essentially dependent on the previous agents otherwise there would be no final locomotion.

The reason it’s called accidens seems to be because the change in question is of the accidental order … in the case of local motion it is the accident called “position.”

 

[Blue_Horizon]

My statement: If an object slows down over hundreds of years, the object is not its own motion, My answer: If motion was the objects intrinsic nature it would always be in motion, there would be no potential for change in its motion, If it slows down, then there is a potential for change in its motion, that means the cause of its motion is extrinsic to the object, it is moved by another, not by itself.

This sounds self contradictory.
Can you define what “change of motion” means here…does it mean acceleration perhaps?
Also, what does “motion is its intrinsic nature” mean?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think the unmoved mover (First Way) and the uncaused first cause (Second Way) are pe se.

Except for the first cause, all causes are said to be ordered per se or essentially.

Causes ordered per accidens don’t depend essentially (for efficacy) on the earlier causes.

OK, how about proving this by exegeting the 1st way in SCG.
I think you will find that a raping of the text myself.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Thanks again, but doesn’t this mean that the falling dominoes series is a “per se” series as well?

If not, why not?

If it is a “per se” series, then how do you explain this quote from Trent Horn:

“To this objection Aquinas makes a distinction between causes that are sequential and causes that are simultaneous. Sequential causation is like a chain of dominoes. After you knock over the first domino you start a chain reaction of dominoes hitting other dominoes. In fact, you could destroy the first domino after you’ve pushed it since it is no longer needed to keep the whole set of dominoes falling. Aquinas believed that sequential causes in the past, like a set of dominoes, could have occurred for all eternity.”

trenthorn.com/2013/01/28/answering-two-objections-to-aquinas/ Objection #2

This seems to infer that the series of falling dominoes must be a “per accidens” causal series, because it can be eternal.

Are the falling dominoes a “per se” series, or a “per accidens” series? If its a “per se” series, then why does Trent Horn imply differently. If its a “per accidens” series, then how is it different from the hand moving the stick, moving the stone?

I tend to agree.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Both series are sequential in nature, although in defense of Aquinas, that may be difficult to detect in the case of the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. The mind sends impulses to the muscles, which contract and move the hand. Which in turn moves the stick. This motion then travels down the stick at something less than the speed of light, and is imparted to the rock. The cause and effect aren’t simultaneous. At the time that the rock moves, the existence of the mind is irrelevant. Once in motion the series of sticks and rocks could be infinite, just like the series of dominoes. And just as with the dominoes, once in motion, the existence of the preceding causes become irrelevant.

From the perspective of causation, the process by which the dominoes fall, and the rocks move, is exactly the same. It’s a sequential series, not a simultaneous one.

In the physical world, there are no “per se” series, if “per se” equates to simultaneous causation. A causal series, is by its very nature, sequential.

This isn’t meant to be a refutation of either the First or Second Ways. I’m simply pointing out that differentiating a “per se” series from a “per accidens” series, isn’t as straight forward as it first appears.

If Trent Horn is correct, and the falling dominoes are a “per accidens” series, then all causal series are “per accidens” series.

Yes I think you have well summarised the issues.
Aquinas’s example of the stick is obviously not simultaneous to post Newton Ian readers and is in fact no different from domino’s.

This itself suggests a flaw in the principle that is being explained…and while one poor example does not invalidate a principle…if no adequate example can be provided in the temporal order…then eventually we must conclude the principle simply does not hold in the temporal order at least.

 

[Aloysium]

. . . may be difficult to detect in the case of the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. The mind sends impulses to the muscles, which contract and move the hand. Which in turn moves the stick. This motion then travels down the stick at something less than the speed of light, and is imparted to the rock. The cause and effect aren’t simultaneous. At the time that the rock moves, the existence of the mind is irrelevant. Once in motion the series of sticks and rocks could be infinite, just like the series of dominoes. And just as with the dominoes, once in motion, the existence of the preceding causes become irrelevant. . .

I seem to frequently be making comments that are beside the point.

The mind may be said to move the person’s hand in that the movement arises from an intention as opposed to something like a spasm. But the mind cannot send impulses to the muscles; neurons in the brain do that. The meaning of the activity is to be found in the mental sphere but the physical activity of the person is physically driven. And, who is to say that what constitutes the person ends at the skin surface. One may break down the material sequence into isolated segments but it does not change the fact that an intent formed in a mind having no spatial dimension, moves the rock.

 

[Vico]

I think you’ve misunderstood and the last statement may not hold.
Chains of locomotion, if their is a final effect, obviously are essentially dependent on the previous agents otherwise there would be no final locomotion.

The reason it’s called accidens seems to be because the change in question is of the accidental order … in the case of local motion it is the accident called “position.”

The cause which is literally “by itself” or “through itself” is per se, all other causes are per accidens. That is why I posed the question of if the dominos can “knock over” of themselves or not. For Aquinas, motion means change not merely position.

You can think of* per accidens* as coincidental and* per se *as not coincidental.

S.T. I, Question 46. The beginning of the duration of creatures, Article 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?

Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity “per se”—thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

 

[Vico]

Both series are sequential in nature, although in defense of Aquinas, that may be difficult to detect in the case of the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. The mind sends impulses to the muscles, which contract and move the hand. Which in turn moves the stick. This motion then travels down the stick at something less than the speed of light, and is imparted to the rock. The cause and effect aren’t simultaneous. At the time that the rock moves, the existence of the mind is irrelevant. Once in motion the series of sticks and rocks could be infinite, just like the series of dominoes. And just as with the dominoes, once in motion, the existence of the preceding causes become irrelevant.

From the perspective of causation, the process by which the dominoes fall, and the rocks move, is exactly the same. It’s a sequential series, not a simultaneous one.

In the physical world, there are no “per se” series, if “per se” equates to simultaneous causation. A causal series, is by its very nature, sequential.

This isn’t meant to be a refutation of either the First or Second Ways. I’m simply pointing out that differentiating a “per se” series from a “per accidens” series, isn’t as straight forward as it first appears.

If Trent Horn is correct, and the falling dominoes are a “per accidens” series, then all causal series are “per accidens” series.

I would not assign sequential and simultaneous descriptions exclusively to one type of cause or another, at this point.

The existence of the preceding causes becomes irrelevant: but not for the type of series that it is which is established with the first cause.

 

[lmelahn]

Both series are sequential in nature, although in defense of Aquinas, that may be difficult to detect in the case of the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. The mind sends impulses to the muscles, which contract and move the hand. Which in turn moves the stick. This motion then travels down the stick at something less than the speed of light, and is imparted to the rock. The cause and effect aren’t simultaneous. At the time that the rock moves, the existence of the mind is irrelevant. Once in motion the series of sticks and rocks could be infinite, just like the series of dominoes. And just as with the dominoes, once in motion, the existence of the preceding causes become irrelevant.

From the perspective of causation, the process by which the dominoes fall, and the rocks move, is exactly the same. It’s a sequential series, not a simultaneous one.

In the physical world, there are no “per se” series, if “per se” equates to simultaneous causation. A causal series, is by its very nature, sequential.

This isn’t meant to be a refutation of either the First or Second Ways. I’m simply pointing out that differentiating a “per se” series from a “per accidens” series, isn’t as straight forward as it first appears.

If Trent Horn is correct, and the falling dominoes are a “per accidens” series, then all causal series are “per accidens” series.

Trent Horn is making the same distinction as I was, between essential (per se) and accidental (per accidens) causes. (Actually, only one particular kind of accidental causes—one in which the effect is separated from the cause by an interval of time.)

Even in the falling dominoes, there are per-se causes in play at every moment. In the moment that one domino strikes the next, one domino exerts a force on the next (and the upright domino exerts an equal force on the falling one). Moreover, once the domino tips over sufficiently, the force of gravitation pulls it down (rather than back to its upright position). Both of those are per-se causes, because the effect (in this case, a force applied to the upright domino and—in the former case—the equal and opposite force applied to the falling domino) is perfectly simultaneous with the cause.

An example of an accidental (per accidens) cause in the falling dominoes would be, for instance, the dominoes that are already fallen and are no longer in play. They are per-accidens precisely because their causative action has ceased.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I seem to frequently be making comments that are beside the point.

The mind may be said to move the person’s hand in that the movement arises from an intention as opposed to something like a spasm. But the mind cannot send impulses to the muscles; neurons in the brain do that. The meaning of the activity is to be found in the mental sphere but the physical activity of the person is physically driven. And, who is to say that what constitutes the person ends at the skin surface. One may break down the material sequence into isolated segments but it does not change the fact that an intent formed in a mind having no spatial dimension, moves the rock.

Why, in so far as temporal efficient causes are concerned, do we have to jump to an allegedly spiritual power called mind/intention. Monkeys use sticks to grub ants from nests…why not just speak of brain and sophisticated mechanistic neural based processors programmed/hardwired for survival.
Meaning, while perhaps a final cause, is irrelevant to the 1st and 2nd ways methinks.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The cause which is literally “by itself” or “through itself” is per se, all other causes are per accidens. That is why I posed the question of if the dominos can “knock over” of themselves or not. For Aquinas, motion means change not merely position.

You can think of* per accidens* as coincidental and* per se *as not coincidental.

S.T. I, Question 46. The beginning of the duration of creatures, Article 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?

Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity “per se”—thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

I’ll admit I am not genius material but I have read this 5 times and it still makes no coherent sense to me.
The stick example appears no different from the generation example.
Perhaps in a pre Newtonian world the difference was once obvious?
And if the examples fail it’s impossible to make sense of all the rest because the “explaining” consequently becomes opaque and mere assertion than proof.
So I still fail to see a meaning for “per accidens” other than describing change in 9 of the 10 categories of Aristotle (a change in 2nd substance is probably per se). Hand stick stone planet muscles or domino’s it’s the accident called position. With nerve signals it’s a flow of electrons, also a change in position. Not sure which accident “being generated” is but Aquinas says it’s per accidens.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Even in the falling dominoes, there are per-se causes in play at every moment. In the moment that one domino strikes the next, one domino exerts a force on the next (and the upright domino exerts an equal force on the falling one).

I do not believe this is true.
Communicated motion ocurrs precisely because the contacting forces are not wholly balanced. The “moment” you speak of above only exists in pure maths…like a point being defined as having zero width. Obviously if a moment in time were truly zero duration then of course there is no motion because motion cannot exist in zero time.
Yes there is an extremely short initial contact time when the 2nd domino does not move. That is because the contact surfaces are molecularly compressing elasticly at the edge causing a minute delay in the motion transmission time.

 

[Vico]

I’ll admit I am not genius material but I have read this 5 times and it still makes no coherent sense to me.
The stick example appears no different from the generation example.
Perhaps in a pre Newtonian world the difference was once obvious?
And if the examples fail it’s impossible to make sense of all the rest because the “explaining” consequently becomes opaque and mere assertion than proof.
So I still fail to see a meaning for “per accidens” other than describing change in 9 of the 10 categories of Aristotle (a change in 2nd substance is probably per se). Hand stick stone planet muscles or domino’s it’s the accident called position. With nerve signals it’s a flow of electrons, also a change in position. Not sure which accident “being generated” is but Aquinas says it’s per accidens.

Aristotle metaphysics is that the immediate efficient cause of an event is simultaneous with the event, not temporally prior to it, and immediate efficient causes imply a series of simultaneous causes and effects. So there is the notion of a substantial or* per se* series of causes. Aristotle and Aquinas say that this type of series must have a first uncaused cause. The accidental or per accidens series has no need for the first cause of the series to still exist at the time of the second cause, and applies to the father son example series.

 

[Partinobodycula]

I would not assign sequential and simultaneous descriptions exclusively to one type of cause or another, at this point.

I agree completely.

Trent Horn is making the same distinction as I was, between essential (per se) and accidental (per accidens) causes. (Actually, only one particular kind of accidental causes—one in which the effect is separated from the cause by an interval of time.)

Even in the falling dominoes, there are per-se causes in play at every moment. In the moment that one domino strikes the next, one domino exerts a force on the next (and the upright domino exerts an equal force on the falling one). Moreover, once the domino tips over sufficiently, the force of gravitation pulls it down (rather than back to its upright position). Both of those are per-se causes, because the effect (in this case, a force applied to the upright domino and—in the former case—the equal and opposite force applied to the falling domino) is perfectly simultaneous with the cause.

An example of an accidental (per accidens) cause in the falling dominoes would be, for instance, the dominoes that are already fallen and are no longer in play. They are per-accidens precisely because their causative action has ceased.

When dealing with classical Newtonian physics it’s very difficult to establish simultaneity. Even when attempting to focus on something as simple as one domino knocking over another. The interaction between dominoes involves the emittance of force particles by one domino, and their subsequent absorption by the next domino. Even at this minute level, there’s a temporal delay between cause and effect. A delay which is evidenced by the time that it takes for a force applied by the hand to propagate downward through the stick. In a series like the dominoes, or the hand moving the stick, there’s always going to be a temporal delay. In this sense the dominoes series, and the hand/stick/rock series are identical.

On the other hand, whereas Newtonian physics says instantaneous causation isn’t possible, quantum physics says that it is. By some seemingly supernatural process at the quantum level, correlation seems to equate to causation. That which is known to be true, seems to have an effect on that which is necessarily true. At any instant in time, there are things that must necessarily be true, based upon that which is known to be true.

I realize that this is a line of reasoning that most people may not have considered, and it could be complete nonsense. But it’s interesting that causation can be instantaneous, not within a temporal series like falling dominoes, but within a contingent series, where the state of one thing is contingent upon the state of another thing. It may be that Aquinas was arguing that it’s a contingent series that can’t be infinite, while a temporal series can be. Even a series without a beginning, like an infinite series of falling dominoes, still needs a cause.

But as I say, this may well be complete nonsense. If so, please disregard my having mentioned it.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Aristotle metaphysics is that the immediate efficient cause of an event is simultaneous with the event, not temporally prior to it, and immediate efficient causes imply a series of simultaneous causes and effects. So there is the notion of a substantial or* per se* series of causes. Aristotle and Aquinas say that this type of series must have a first uncaused cause. The accidental or per accidens series has no need for the first cause of the series to still exist at the time of the second cause, and applies to the father son example series.

Do you believe hand stick stone example is simultaneous. No post Newtonian thinker could support this.
Do you know of any real world example of a per se series caused effect?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

But it’s interesting that causation can be instantaneous, not within a temporal series like falling dominoes, but within a contingent series, where the state of one thing is contingent upon the state of another thing. It may be that Aquinas was arguing that it’s a contingent series that can’t be infinite, while a temporal series can be.

I think that if Aristotle and Aquinas clearly agree the world and it’s locomotions could be eternal then that to me sounds equivalent to an eternal chain of dominos falling?

 

[Vico]

Do you believe hand stick stone example is simultaneous. No post Newtonian thinker could support this.
Do you know of any real world example of a per se series caused effect?

The modern preference is derived from Hume. When I post about Aristotle and Aquinas I use there definitions or the conclusions will be wrong.

 

[Aloysium]

Why, in so far as temporal efficient causes are concerned, do we have to jump to an allegedly spiritual power called mind/intention. Monkeys use sticks to grub ants from nests…why not just speak of brain and sophisticated mechanistic neural based processors programmed/hardwired for survival.
Meaning, while perhaps a final cause, is irrelevant to the 1st and 2nd ways methinks.

I don’t know what you are talking about and you seem to have no idea what I was getting at. How simply perfect for a philosophy forum.

 

[ynotzap]

This sounds self contradictory.
Can you define what “change of motion” means here…does it mean acceleration perhaps?
Also, what does “motion is its intrinsic nature” mean?

Referring to Post #100: I used the word “extrinsic” when I really meant “external” But I used the word “intrinsic” correctly.

If an object slows down in its motion, there is a change in motion from one of a higher degree, to a lower degree, that means the object had the potential to move (change) in its speed. To do this it would have to be moved by another, a force, to cause the change. We are not talking about acceleration, we are talking about change. Change in this case has to do with the nature of the object, which is a metaphysical subject. Change is produced by a movement from potency to act, and thats in the nature of the universe. Acceleration is dealt with in physics, the mathematical measurement of local motion, distance covered in a certain measure of time. These two degrees of concepts must be kept separate to keep the proper relationship between the two. One involves the second degree of abstraction, the physical and mathematical, and the other involves the nature of motion, the causes, and effects of same.(metaphysical)the third degree of abstraction.

And I believe that this is causing much confusion in this thread. Intrinsic means that in an object that is moving itself, that motion is part of its nature, and if it is, then it has no potency to produce a change in motion, and this is a statement dealing with the things nature, and not with measurement as in acceleration. Physical (mathematical measurement)vs Metaphysical. Second degree of abstraction vs third degree of abstraction

When you used your gas pedal and brake pedal example, you were in the physical, mathematical degree of abstraction, the second degree. I was answering from the metaphysical degree, the nature of motion, and you presented a problem when you mentioned an object moving itself which entailed a metaphysical problem. A thing is moved by another,and not moved by itself, not directly involving physical friction, mechanical power, etc.

 

[ynotzap]

In the gas pedal and brake pedal example, if the motion was intrinsic in the nature of the pedals, they would move themselves (analogy to the original problem of an object moving itself) Both pedals had the potential to be moved by another. An object moving itself, has motion as an essential part of its nature, and is not moved by another. We can’t change natures. Motion is not intrinsic to the nature of our universe, inherent Things are moved by another, external to their nature