Montonâs main claim is that ID doesnât postulate God as the designer. That it could be aliens for example. And that we should take proponents of ID at their word that it is not theistic. Of course we should.
philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2583/1/Methodological_Naturalism_2.pdf.
Then I need go no further than this. ID is not necessarily theistic, ergo it cannot be identical to Creationism.
You have come to your senses.
For anyone to propose or defend ID does not entail they are Creationists. It would be possible, in principle, then, for even a Creationist to defend ID on non-theistic scientific or evidential merit provided the Creationist was using scientific methods alone to argue the case. It shouldnât be assumed that merely because he is a Creationist, that he is arguing for ID on Creationist assumptions. Clearly, Monton canât be arguing from those grounds, so why would a Creationist have to be, necessarily?
Hereâs the other problem for you. Creationism of the young Earth variety, would seem to stand or fall on scientific grounds. To be taken seriously, it would have to prove the Earth was created 6000 years ago by resorting to forensic evidence and scientific methods. Creationism is falsifiable in the sense that science can address its claims.
Think about that, Bradski. What sense can there be in dismissing Creationism as ânot scienceâ when its claims are provable or not on scientific grounds?
Creationism and ID might both make implicit claims that a âwhoâ was involved in bringing about life, but both must establish their case based upon âhow.â That question is within the purview of science. In fact, forensics is a science that attempts to get at the question of who by addressing the question of how with respect to circumstances by proving that the how had to involve a who.
For a judge to claim Creationism and ID are ânot scienceâ based upon the contention that science does not address âwhoâ questions contradicts his own standard of what evidence science can provide with respect to accountability and how he allows science to be used in his courtroom to make certain or near certain determinations regarding âwhoâ perpetrated or brought about certain events.
In the case of perpetrating life itself, how can a judge make a ruling that intelligence was not involved by merely siding with those who simply assume that it wasnât but take no pains to prove it wasnât. That determination is far from settled because it hasnât been sufficiently proven, merely assumed by begging the question that scientific methods do not address it.
How would science âknowâ that scientific methods cannot address questions concerning who without testing those methods against a who question? Clearly, in forensic science, the who question is broached. ID is a perfect case for testing the scope of science against its own presumptions, perhaps.
In fact, if the judgeâs ruling is taken at face value it means the determination that intelligence was not involved need not be proven but merely assumed to be true by legal fiat. Why would a legal determination by a judge be an acceptable âmethodâ for establishing a scientific claim for any real scientist? I thought real scientists didnât do âdogmaâ with regard to ANY claims. Miller ought to be having night terrors about this one.