The problem of evil

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The first issue you raise is easily answered. Trying to dismiss it as a numbers game does not work. Of course it is better to have more people saved and in heaven with God than fewer, can you seriously deny that?
And since there is no logical contradiction between having “free will” without actual “evil”, and there is no upper limit to the number of people in such a world, God can actualize (or instantiate) such a world.
A possible world refers to broadly logically possible, when I talk about it not being feasible for God to create people with free will who never sin, I mean that such a scenario may (or may not) be broadly logically possible, but it might have drawbacks that would explain why God does not create such a world.

How do you know their is no limit to such people? It may be that no possible world exists in which all people freely choose good, without that possible world having some significant drawbacks. Number of people is one possible example; there could be others. It seems that you are taking on a very difficult burden of proof if you are claiming that there is a possible world with no drawbacks where all creatures freely choose good. By contrast for the free will defense to work, all it only has to be possible that there are no feasible worlds God can create with creatures that always freely choose good.
Are you familiar with Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity? It seems to have some relation to the determinism/compatibilism issue.
If God would instill a proper disposition in every human being, he would not “force” anyone, but he would “nudge” everyone. Do you see the difference?
No. If God creates people free but unable to sin; then they are unable to sin because he made them that way. That is to say, their actions are compelled or limited by a force outside themselves. In which case they are not free.
This gets into issues of determinism and compatibility. You seem to take a compatibliist view and argue that determinism is compatible with free will. I am inclined to follow the philosopher Van Inwagen see determinism as incompatible with free will. If my actions can be accounted for by causal factors outside myself, (ie, if my not doing evil can be fully accounted for by God making me unable to do evil), then it is very hard to see how I can be free.
 
So many kinds of “if”.

What would happen if thinkers/philosophers thought about human nature as it actually exists in the real world of today?
 
(Continued…)

Did I ever say this? Nope. Did any other proponent of the freewill explanation ever say this? Not that I’m aware of. Quite frankly, I think it is incredible that you have decided to once more committed a straw man fallacy. And not only this, you did the exact same one I detailed yesterday in Post #61! This now makes at least two, and possibly as many as four, straw man arguments you’ve done in a single thread.
Out of curiosity, what’s your record?

Our genetic heritage is created by God.
Nature and our capacity to nurture are created by God.
This is why I stated that our disposition to do good ultimately has its source in God.

Our use of the term “disposition” was specifically the role of the conscience. In other words, the disposition to choose right over wrong. But that is not the only disposition that confronts people. There is also, for example, concupiscence, which means that we are susceptible to the temptation to commit evil. Many sins, after all, have a sensual allurement to them. So there are two dispositions in opposition with each other. One is from God (the conscience) and the other arises from our fallen human nature (concupiscence). So contrary to your above statement, every disposition is not hard wired and programmed by God.

Both dispositions guide our decision-making process, but neither can force compliance. And let me also point out that you have not given an adequate explanation as to why having a God-given conscience results in the loss of freewill. In your above statement you said that such would be the case without saying why.

Now that’s what I call an understatement!

Here is a list of some of the questions and challenges that you have not been interested in answering. Anyone reading this thread can judge for themselves how much of a bearing these have had on our debate, and/or whether or not they were worth responding to:

Post #54: “If you think that is a “no true Scotsman” fallacy then prove it by using my previous statements that demonstrate me doing it.”

Post #55: “Goodness = God-ness. Evil is contrary to goodness and therefore contrary to God. How can a person commit evil against his neighbor and this not be, at the same time, a rejection of God?”

Post #55: “If you want to properly refute my position, you need to demonstrate how someone within the confines of your example can be a ‘true champion of virtue.’ So far, you haven’t done that.”

Post #56:: “How can it be possible to help someone with surgery without it also being possible to use those same methods in a perverse way to inflict torture?” (etc.)

Post #57: “I challenge you to give me one example of an evil action that is not a deprivation or perversion of that which is good.”

Post #61: “So where exactly did I say, ‘To have ‘true’ freewill it must incorporate the specific freedom to commit evil’?”

Post #61: “Why does it have to logically follow that someone will commit an evil act in order for my premise to work?”

Post #62: “…you said they ’would never want (or wish or will) to perform evil acts’ (emphasis added). How can someone have the freewill to do evil but not the will to do evil? That is not a rhetorical question, so I’d like an answer.”

Post #62: “…you say that my position somehow results in Mary and the saints being forced by God to obey their consciences. How about working that one out for me again?”

Post #63: “…my challenge to you is to use the ‘no true Scotsman’ formula (as presented above) with the statements that I actually made.

And so you claim that you’re simply just “not interested” in responding to these questions.
Well, suffice to say I can easily envision another possible reason that explains your lack of response.
Well, some of these questions are obviously just absurd. I mean really… How can it be possible to help someone with surgery without it also being possible to use those same methods in a perverse way to inflict torture?

Yeah, the surgeon who re-assembled me a while back, and then the next guy… well once he had finished with us, he must have gone into another room to torture the enemy. sheesh!

Sometimes logic can turn into mental masturbation or some mental variation of mr toad’s wild ride.

If you read Aquinas, he seems like he makes a logical case, until you read Kant who refutes him utterly. Anselm suffered the same fate. So all the mind games are over. You can’t prove much in your own head. It is about faith.
 
Well, some of these questions are obviously just absurd. I mean really… How can it be possible to help someone with surgery without it also being possible to use those same methods in a perverse way to inflict torture?
That was the point I was basically making when I initially presented that question in Post #56. As far as I was concerned, the question was rhetorical. But if Keeler somehow felt that it was possible I wanted him to actually explain why. In other words, if someone criticizes God for allowing torture to exist then one should consider how realistic that possibility is. A couple of the other questions I presented in the list you quoted were initially meant to be rhetorical as well. Naturally, I don’t expect a rhetorical question to be answered (otherwise it isn’t really rhetorical). But if someone thinks that it is not actually rhetorical and that the question can properly be answered in a manner that refutes my position then they might as well have a go at it.
Yeah, the surgeon who re-assembled me a while back, and then the next guy… well once he had finished with us, he must have gone into another room to torture the enemy. sheesh!
Actually, when I presented this question I was thinking more of a dental example than a surgical one - to be more specific, the infamous scene from The Marathon Man.
“Is it safe?” (insert cringe!)
 
You said that if everyone would always choose to do “good” (as I did in the simple example above), that would mean that God “forced” them to choose “good” by instilling a proper disposition in them. That is what I dispute.
How does “instilling a proper disposition” equate God forcing someone to do good? You stated that your conscience stemmed from your upbringings (at least partially). If in the past your parents taught you the value of doing good, does that mean that you are now forced to do good? Obviously not. After all, you are free to heed what they taught and free to do what is contrary. Objectively speaking (in terms of free will and disposition), what is the difference between your parents teaching and encouraging you to do good via verbal instructions and God teaching and encouraging you through the disposition known as the conscience?
We seem to agree that my choosing good was not “forced” by my upbringing, in other words, I had free will in deciding either way. If God would instill a proper disposition in every human being, he would not “force” anyone, but he would “nudge” everyone. 🙂 Do you see the difference?
I’m still completely at a loss at the point your trying to make. Don’t get me wrong, I completely understand what you are saying here. But what I don’t understand is how you think this statement is somehow contrary to my own. God can (and does) install a proper disposition. A disposition, by definition, “disposes” someone towards a particular goal. Therefore, it is an inclination, a guide, a “nudge” (as you put it). A disposition does not enforce compliance. But I fail to see where my free will defense somehow equates to God forcing people to do good. If that is the argument that you are making, then, using my elaboration of the “What to Do with the Money?” example, show me precisely where the transition happens from free will into loss of free will. Or if you feel that my free will defense does not actually allow free will to begin with, then clearly make the case for it.
 
Before we go any further, I will summarize the “free will defense”: “free will is so precious, that in order to have it, God must ‘compromize’ and tolerate the existence of evil, because the existence of free will logically and inevitable leads to the actuality of evil actions”. That is THE “free will” defense. It does not speak of the number of moral agents involved, or the number of morally significant decisions they must take.
The first issue you raise is easily answered. Trying to dismiss it as a numbers game does not work. Of course it is better to have more people saved and in heaven with God than fewer, can you seriously deny that?
It depends on the “down-side”. Sure, it is reasonable that 10 million saved is “better” compared to 1 million saved - caeteris paribus! But why would it be “better” for God to have 10 million “saved” and 100 million “damned”, rather than have 1 million “saved” and none damned? (Or even 10 million saved and only ONE damned as opposed to 1 million saved and none damned?) That is a clear numbers game. Do you think that the 100 million of “colletaral damage” is “acceptable” for God? Last time I heard, God does not want even one person to be “damned”. (The numbers are drawn out of thin air, for illustrative purposes only).
A possible world refers to broadly logically possible, when I talk about it not being feasible for God to create people with free will who never sin, I mean that such a scenario may (or may not) be broadly logically possible, but it might have drawbacks that would explain why God does not create such a world.
But if that were the case, then it would not be because of the “free will”, it would be because of something else, which you did not specify.
How do you know their is no limit to such people? It may be that no possible world exists in which all people freely choose good, without that possible world having some significant drawbacks.
“May” is not an argument. What significant drawbacks? And again, if there were such drawbacks (and I cannot emphasize enough that “may” is NOT an argument) then the reason that God would not create such a world is not because “free will leads to evil”, but some other (unspecified) reason - and thus the “free will defense” fails.
Number of people is one possible example; there could be others.
What drawbacks? Be specific. And again: “could be”?
It seems that you are taking on a very difficult burden of proof if you are claiming that there is a possible world with no drawbacks where all creatures freely choose good.
I am willing to accept the burden to prove that the number of moral agents and the number morally significant decisions does not have an upper limit. You wish to inject the “no drawbacks” into this claim. That cannot be accepted unless you can specify “what those drawbacks” might be? I cannot account for the existence or the lack of some “unspecified drawbacks”, I hope you see that.
By contrast for the free will defense to work, all it only has to be possible that there are no feasible worlds God can create with creatures that always freely choose good.
No way, my friend. “Possible” and “may” and their synonyms are not enough. They are not arguments. But it is very simple to show that there are possible (or feasible - you did not specify the difference so far) worlds where significant free will exists and there are no evil actions, and where the number of moral agents and the number morally significant decisions are as large as you want to.
Are you familiar with Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity? It seems to have some relation to the determinism/compatibilism issue.
Of course I am. Plantinga himself admits that his reasoning is insufficient.
No. If God creates people free but unable to sin; then they are unable to sin because he made them that way. That is to say, their actions are compelled or limited by a force outside themselves. In which case they are not free.
That is not what I said.
This gets into issues of determinism and compatibility. You seem to take a compatibliist view and argue that determinism is compatible with free will. I am inclined to follow the philosopher Van Inwagen see determinism as incompatible with free will. If my actions can be accounted for by causal factors outside myself, (ie, if my not doing evil can be fully accounted for by God making me unable to do evil), then it is very hard to see how I can be free.
No, I do not hold the compatibilist view. I think it is hogwash, and free will must be libertatian, or there is no free will. I refer back to the example I gave above about the 100 bucks which I give back to the cashier. Regardless where my thought process, and/or inclination came from, whether from my parents and my upbringing, or from God, at the moment of decision they are “not there”, they are not prodding me to give back those 100 bucks. I am free to give it back, or to keep it - free in the libertarian sense of the word. I simply do not wish to keep it. It is not like a mafioso holding a gun to my head (or to the head of my loved ones) and demanding that I give the money back. There is no one “forcing” me. The decision is mine and it is made freely.
 
How does “instilling a proper disposition” equate God forcing someone to do good? You stated that your conscience stemmed from your upbringings (at least partially). If in the past your parents taught you the value of doing good, does that mean that you are now forced to do good? Obviously not. After all, you are free to heed what they taught and free to do what is contrary. Objectively speaking (in terms of free will and disposition), what is the difference between your parents teaching and encouraging you to do good via verbal instructions and God teaching and encouraging you through the disposition known as the conscience?
That is exactly what I have been saying all along!
I’m still completely at a loss at the point your trying to make. Don’t get me wrong, I completely understand what you are saying here. But what I don’t understand is how you think this statement is somehow contrary to my own. God can (and does) install a proper disposition. A disposition, by definition, “disposes” someone towards a particular goal. Therefore, it is an inclination, a guide, a “nudge” (as you put it). A disposition does not enforce compliance. But I fail to see where my free will defense somehow equates to God forcing people to do good. If that is the argument that you are making, then, using my elaboration of the “What to Do with the Money?” example, show me precisely where the transition happens from free will into loss of free will. Or if you feel that my free will defense does not actually allow free will to begin with, then clearly make the case for it.
Now I am confused. I went back and re-read your purple-highlighted sentence. Here it is:

“Having the freedom to do good or evil must include the actual ability to choose and do evil. If a person is prevented from choosing and doing evil then he was not actually free to do to begin with. Moreover, within a loving relationship the beloved must be free to accept or reject the lover. God created us to be in a loving relationship with him, and it is by evil action that we reject him. Therefore the we must be free to choose to do good or evil, and likewise free to act on our choices in terms of good or evil.”

It is all fine and dandy. I agree with what you say. But that is NOT the “free will” defense. I summarized it (in red and bold) at the very beginning of the post above.
 
free will is so precious, that in order to have it, God must ‘compromize’ and tolerate the existence of evil, because the existence of free will logically and inevitable leads to the actuality of evil actions
Sorry to disagree with you right away, but Eric is right that there are different versions of the free will defense. You can’t try to force me to defend one specific one. I told you, a different version is that though it is possible that free will not inevitably lead to evil, such a world may not be feasible because it may have other drawbacks. I don’t know if even Plantinga holds that free will inevitably leads to moral evil.

He seems to hold that there may be possible worlds that even an omnipotent being cannot actualize.

I still dismiss your numbers game. All I need to do is have to make sense to say that it is better that more people be saved than fewer. If this is plausible (and it seems obviously true), then my view works. The burden is on you to show that this is not plausible since you are the one making the argument (ie. the problem of evil). As long as God gives each person sufficient grace to be saved, the the fact that such a world might also have more people in hell is irrelevant and there are understandings of hell that mitigate this fact anyway.
What drawbacks? Be specific. And again: “could be”?
You keep bringing this up, so let me spend a moment on it. You keep saying that I am the one making the point and so it is not enough for me to say “may”, I must prove my point specifically.

This would be true, if say, I were making an argument for God’s existence. But I am not the one making the argument, you are, by defending the so-called problem of evil. You are arguing that the existence of evil is not reconcilable with the existence of an omnipotent, morally perfect, omniscient God. The burden is on you to prove this. It seems at least possible that no world exists where all creatures freely choose good that does not also have significant drawbacks, such as a small number of people. To maintain the problem of evil, you must show this this is not the case, but this is a very substantial burden of proof that I don’t see how you can make.
No, I do not hold the compatibilist view. I think it is hogwash, and free will must be libertatian, or there is no free will. I refer back to the example I gave above about the 100 bucks which I give back to the cashier. Regardless where my thought process, and/or inclination came from, whether from my parents and my upbringing, or from God, at the moment of decision they are “not there”, they are not prodding me to give back those 100 bucks. I am free to give it back, or to keep it - free in the libertarian sense of the word. I simply do not wish to keep it. It is not like a mafioso holding a gun to my head (or to the head of my loved ones) and demanding that I give the money back. There is no one “forcing” me. The decision is mine and it is made freely.
I’m glad we agree that compatiblism is implausible. But the problem is opponents of Plantinga’s defense (such as Anthony Flew) claim that his defense only works on incompatibilism. That is to say, if compatibilism is true, then his defense may not work. Despite, what you say about you rejecting compatiblism, your view seems to be precisely this. Namely that God makes us unable to do evil, but at the moment of choice, he is not forcing you. This is a problem, because if he made you unable to do evil, then the reason you are unable to do evil (at any specific point) is because God make you that way. So the reason at the moment of decision that you do not do evil is because God made you that way. In this case, then, your actions has been determined by something outside of yourself (namely God having made you that way), and you are not free.

So though you claim to reject compatibilism, your view seems to me to be clearly compatibilist.

I have a question, as a point of clarification. Are you defending an evidential or logical version of the problem of evil? At first I had the impression you were defending a logical version, partly because this is the version that Plantinga is famous for answering and you indicated disagreement with Plantinga, but your last post to me seems mixed on the question.

Finally, this would take us rather far afield, but it seems like issues of God’s relationship to time also come into play here. You seem to be assuming a Molinist view (God predicts the future based on his knowledge of present counterfactuals). But on Open Theism (God does not know the future because it does not exist yet), the version of the problem of evil that you are defending does not work. Similarly, on the Simple foreknowledge view (God does know the future), then God can’t change the future because that would entail a contradiction. I’m just curious as to what your view is here.
 
Sorry to disagree with you right away, but Eric is right that there are different versions of the free will defense.
Why don’t you enumerate them? The one that I quoted is the only one I am familiar with. Here…
He seems to hold that there may be possible worlds that even an omnipotent being cannot actualize.
Example? Just one example? Even better, why don’t you tell me what kinds of characteristics would prevent an omnipotent being from actualizing a possible world? In other words: “what does omnipotence mean?”. Apologists keep on asserting that God can violate the laws of nature, if he so chooses. The only thing he cannot create is logical contradictions (though I have seen some people around here, who assert that God can create logically contradictory states of affairs, too. Yes, stupidity is not restricted to atheists only).
I still dismiss your numbers game. All I need to do is have to make sense to say that it is better that more people be saved than fewer.
Sure sounds like the very un-catholic principle that the end (more “saved”) justifies the means (lots of damned). Besides, the number of saved (without any damned) has no upper limit. Easy to prove it. All you have to do is ask.
You keep bringing this up, so let me spend a moment on it. You keep saying that I am the one making the point and so it is not enough for me to say “may”, I must prove my point specifically.
I am not asking you to “prove” anything. I am asking for some example. You keep saying that there might be some unspecified reason that might prevent God from actualizing a certain possible world (without a logical contradiction). Sorry, but that is just a totally empty assertion and contradictory to omnipotence (as we understand the concept).
It seems at least possible that no world exists where all creatures freely choose good that does not also have significant drawbacks, such as a small number of people. To maintain the problem of evil, you must show this this is not the case, but this is a very substantial burden of proof that I don’t see how you can make.
I really don’t care what “seems” possible. Tell me what IS possible. The “small number of people” is not a drawback to begin with. Give me one real example.
I have a question, as a point of clarification. Are you defending an evidential or logical version of the problem of evil?
I don’t defend anything. The “problem of evil” exists. There are saveral attempts to reconcile it with the alleged divine benevolence. In this thread the “free will” attempt is used, and I am talking against that attempt.
Finally, this would take us rather far afield, but it seems like issues of God’s relationship to time also come into play here. You seem to be assuming a Molinist view (God predicts the future based on his knowledge of present counterfactuals). But on Open Theism (God does not know the future because it does not exist yet), the version of the problem of evil that you are defending does not work. Similarly, on the Simple foreknowledge view (God does know the future), then God can’t change the future because that would entail a contradiction. I’m just curious as to what your view is here.
Let’s not get deep into this. Obviously I do not subscribe to either one, since I do not believe in God’s existence. I find the Molinist “middle knowledge” unacceptable. The Open Theism approach is the most logical, and it does not lead to contradictions or problems. And as you said, it does present an adequate solution to the “problem of evil”. Just like Rabbi Kuschner’s solution who says that God is not omnipotent, and resolves the problem differently. God “knowing” the future presents all sorts of problems, which we can discuss some other time. To show the kinds of problems it can lead to, consider this question: “Can God know the contents of a book, which was never written, because the author was never born?”. Both omniscience and omnipotence are concepts which are not rigorously defined, and they should be.
 
Before we go any further, I will summarize the “free will defense”: “free will is so precious, that in order to have it, God must ‘compromize’ and tolerate the existence of evil, because the existence of free will logically and inevitable leads to the actuality of evil actions”. That is THE “free will” defense.
That is exactly what I have been saying all along!

Now I am confused. I went back and re-read your purple-highlighted sentence. Here it is:

“Having the freedom to do good or evil must include the actual ability to choose and do evil. If a person is prevented from choosing and doing evil then he was not actually free to do to begin with. Moreover, within a loving relationship the beloved must be free to accept or reject the lover. God created us to be in a loving relationship with him, and it is by evil action that we reject him. Therefore the we must be free to choose to do good or evil, and likewise free to act on our choices in terms of good or evil.”

It is all fine and dandy. I agree with what you say. But that is NOT the “free will” defense. I summarized it (in red and bold) at the very beginning of the post above.
Sorry to disagree with you right away, but Eric is right that there are different versions of the free will defense. You can’t try to force me to defend one specific one. I told you, a different version is that though it is possible that free will not inevitably lead to evil, such a world may not be feasible because it may have other drawbacks. I don’t know if even Plantinga holds that free will inevitably leads to moral evil.
Why don’t you enumerate them? The one that I quoted is the only one I am familiar with. Here…
Keeler, I invite you to read the summaries of various free will enumerations in this link as well as this one. If you believe that they all saying basically the same thing as the free will defense definition you posted, then we can compare and contrast certain ones to see whether or not this is true. In any event, let me repeat yet again that the only free will defense I am interested in defending is the one I have been using in this thread (as reiterated in Post #74).

When comparing the free will defense I have used with the one you provided a link for, the distinction between the two begins to arise in Step #7. The linked formula starts speaking of a world populated with people of free will having greater value than lacking free people. My example, however, does not speak of what has more value (which can be very subjective). Rather, my position stems from the idea that God created us to be in a loving relationship with him. Free will, therefore, is a requirement and the absence of free will is not a possibility (as I explained back in my earlier love potion example).

(Continued in my next post)
 
(Continued…)
Why don’t you enumerate them? The one that I quoted is the only one I am familiar with. Here…
The information you provided in this link gives us something to work with. It allows me to demonstrate how my position on free will differs from the link’s definition (which I just finished doing in Post #89). It also gives me the chance to apply the objections against the link’s free will defense with mine, and we can see how well mine holds up (and by “mine” I mean the one elaborated upon by Archbishop Fulton Sheen that I have been using, with a little C.S. Lewis thrown in for discussions on the conscience).

Going back to the elaboration on free will that you linked, I will now apply the objections to the linked free will defense to my free will defense. The linked handout simply used bullet points for the objections, but I will assign them numbers.

1) It says that the free will defense does not address the reality of natural evil. It says, “Some thinkers try to remedy this by saying that natural evil is a result of free Satanic agency”, but it does not say why this is not a feasible argument. I, for one, do not make this exact argument. Eden was an ideal world where humans lived in harmony with both God and the rest of creation. Through sin, that harmony was disrupted, allowing for the existence of natural disasters. Moreover, when we suffer in this world as a result of nature, it reminds us that although we were born into this world, we were not created for this world, but rather for heaven.

2) Suffice to say that (as can be seen in my past posts) I do not believe in determinism (in the sense that past experience and external factors cause us to choose one thing over another).

3) I agree that there is nothing logically contradictory in saying that it is possible for a world to exist where everyone freely chooses to do good. That was, after all, the intention for human existence in Eden. But then the handout asks, “So why can’t God create that world, in which He foresees that people will freely choose to do what is right, rather than one in which He foresees that they will freely choose to do wrong?” But the real question is not “Why can’t God do this?” but rather “Why didn’t God do this?” It comes down to the question as to what sort of world did God intend to make. When God created this world, he did not intend to create a world where everyone will always freely choose good. He intended to create what Archbishop Fulton Sheen called a “moral universe.” I have described this concept in this thread as follows:

Post #56
God intends that this universe be a moral universe. It is a place where he guides, nourishes and empowers people to be champions of virtue. It is through grappling with the temptation to sin, and choosing not to, that a person grows in virtue. No one can be a great saint unless there is the possibility of being a great sinner instead. And whereas there are those who use their freewill to make righteous choices and become champions of virtue, there are those who use their freewill to make evil choices. If God prevents them from sinning then human freedom does not truly exist. And God cannot love people and at the same time rob them of their freedom. After all, forcing people to do ones will is a violation of the whole concept of love.

Post #56
“God created us to not only live virtuous lives, but lives of heroic virtue. The greater the reality of hate, the greater the act of love which overcomes it. The greater the temptation and opportunity to commit gluttony, the greater the act of temperance which overcomes it. And so on and so on. In the current state of affairs in our world, there is the opportunity for people to be true champions of virtue, and moral victories can indeed be victories in every sense of the word. A man may want his teenage son to be a great football player, but if his son only plays football against kindergartners then his successes would hardly be considered “great victories.” God doesn’t just want us to love, but to love powerfully.”

4 & 5) In light of what I stated about the moral universe, I respond to the handout’s 4th and 5th objections by pointing out that our world allows for great acts of virtue in the face of great evil (whether that evil be potential or actualized).

6) First of all, this is labeled as “Step 7”, but it is actually 6. This objection does not really apply to my position because it questions the “value” of free people. As I pointed out earlier, my position is not concerned with the value of a person having free will, but with the fact that free will is required in a loving relationship.
 
I agree that there is nothing logically contradictory in saying that it is possible for a world to exist where everyone freely chooses to do good.
I am glad to hear this.
That was, after all, the intention for human existence in Eden. But then the handout asks, “So why can’t God create that world, in which He foresees that people will freely choose to do what is right, rather than one in which He foresees that they will freely choose to do wrong?” But the real question is not “Why can’t God do this?” but rather “Why didn’t God do this?”
Well, since you agreed that God could have created the world where everyone always freely chooses right, now we can go on.

Your question: “Why didn’t God do this?” - is problematic. No one is in the position to speak with authority about God’s intentions. Any answer is just empty speculation and conjecture. No archbishop, no pope can offer a substantiated reason.

But I will answer your central idea: “And God cannot love people and at the same time rob them of their freedom. After all, forcing people to do ones will is a violation of the whole concept of love.”

So, if a parent “robs” the child from exerting his freedom to shoot his sister with a gun which was negligiently left in a place where the child could pick it up - then the parent did not love the child - because he interfered with the child’s freedom??? Yes, the example is extreme, but it illustrates that limiting or curtailing someone’s freedom of action is very much compatible with love. Actually “real love” demands that the parent would seriously interfere with the child’s freedom if and when the child would do some irrevocable action.

You make a logical mistake when you insinuate that creating a world with free will and no actual evil (potential is fine!) somehow “forces” the moral agents to choose the “right thing”. Think about it.
 
I am glad to hear this.

Well, since you agreed that God could have created the world where everyone always freely chooses right, now we can go on.

Your question: “Why didn’t God do this?” - is problematic. No one is in the position to speak with authority about God’s intentions. Any answer is just empty speculation and conjecture. No archbishop, no pope can offer a substantiated reason.
Actually there is at least one person who is in a position to speak about God’s intention, and that is God himself. When I stated that God intended to create a moral universe, I am simply conveying what God has revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition.
But I will answer your central idea: “And God cannot love people and at the same time rob them of their freedom. After all, forcing people to do ones will is a violation of the whole concept of love.”
So, if a parent “robs” the child from exerting his freedom to shoot his sister with a gun which was negligiently left in a place where the child could pick it up - then the parent did not love the child - because he interfered with the child’s freedom??? Yes, the example is extreme, but it illustrates that limiting or curtailing someone’s freedom of action is very much compatible with love. Actually “real love” demands that the parent would seriously interfere with the child’s freedom if and when the child would do some irrevocable action.
There needs to be a bit of clarification here. I will remind you that my central idea has two parts. The first is that God intended to create a moral universe where it is possible to be a champion of virtue, and it is not possible to be a great saint unless it is possible to otherwise be a great sinner.

The second part is that God created us to be in a loving relationship with him. Therefore we must be free to accept or reject him, because true love demands that the beloved be free to accept or reject the lover. We reject God through evil action, hence we must be free to choose and do evil.

What I just stated is another reiteration of what I originally presented way back in Post #4. But consider how you attempted to refute my position in the above quote. I never said that the rule of love has to permit unfettered freedom. Within every loving relationship there needs to be a proper set of boundaries. So yes, I agree with you that curtailing someone’s freedom can be compatible with love (depending on the circumstances). God can, and does, restrict our freedom in various ways, and the manner in which he does this does not violate the concept of a loving relationship. But this fact does not actually refute the free will position that I have been using in this thread, because there are still other ways in which God could curtail our freedom which would be a violation of the requirements of a loving relationship. Likewise, going back to the other aspect of my central idea, there are ways in which God could curtail our freedom that would consequently hamper our ability to be champions of virtue.
You make a logical mistake when you insinuate that creating a world with free will and no actual evil (potential is fine!) somehow “forces” the moral agents to choose the “right thing”. Think about it.
So we’re back to this again, are we? Keeler, over the past 9 days you have made a statement like this concerning my free will position at least 10 times. And not once have you actually demonstrated how my position either insinuates or leads to such a conclusion (despite the fact that I have repeatedly asked you to do so). So I will yet again state that my free will position does not lead to the conclusion (or even insinuates) that the moral agents which I have described force a person to do a good action (or an evil one).

If it is your position that the free will position that I have been using somehow leads to such a conclusion then make a case for it. Use my elaboration on the “What to Do with the Money?” example in Post 76 and state the place in that example where the person ends up being forced to choose and do a specific action. Keep in mind that my elaboration in Post #76 is an example of my free will position at work.
 
Actually there is at least one person who is in a position to speak about God’s intention, and that is God himself.
Ok. So let God speak for himself, and we shall all listen. But don’t try to wiggle out and say that God “did” speak two thousand years ago. Old stories do not count. Today we have TV, we have the internet, and a captive audience. Until God actually speaks for himself, all we have is opinions - and my opinion is just as valid as yours (neither of them is worth a “dayum” :)).
When I stated that God intended to create a moral universe, I am simply conveying what God has revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition.
That is what you believe. If God wishes me to accept what you say, he needs to affirm that your belief is accurate. Otherwise it is your word only (MAYBE supported by the CC of course), but I don’t accept it - as you surely know by now.
There needs to be a bit of clarification here. I will remind you that my central idea has two parts. The first is that God intended to create a moral universe where it is possible to be a champion of virtue, and it is not possible to be a great saint unless it is possible to otherwise be a great sinner.
Possibility is fine - actuality is not. Though it is not really needed. You seem to forget that we must take God’s omnipotence into account. To illustrate what I mean, let’s use an example: “suppose God wants us to be very strong, physically, and therefore he puts us into situations when we must exercise our muscles and become physically fit”. But God could select a much better method (and foolproof at that) by creating everyone strong and healthy in the first place, so the “no pain, no gain” method is not necessary. By the same token, God could create everyone a “champion of virtue”, right off the bat. Much simpler method.
The second part is that God created us to be in a loving relationship with him. Therefore we must be free to accept or reject him, because true love demands that the beloved be free to accept or reject the lover.
So far, so good. I have been told that my lack of belief “counts” as a “rejection” of God. That is perfectly sufficient. God wants everyone to love him (I think “worship” is a better word here). Some of us do not love him - because we do not believe that he exists. Voila! There are the “evil sinners” so he can throw all of us into the eternal fire, where the smell of our burning flesh will resemble to the stench of the burnt offering, so pleasing to the nostrils of the Lord.
We reject God through evil action, hence we must be free to choose and do evil.
What evil? I chose “evil” by not believing in God. There is absolutely no need for me to be able to commit any other “evil”. Why do I have to be able to commit “other evils”, too? Think about it, please!
What I just stated is another reiteration of what I originally presented way back in Post #4. But consider how you attempted to refute my position in the above quote. I never said that the rule of love has to permit unfettered freedom. Within every loving relationship there needs to be a proper set of boundaries. So yes, I agree with you that curtailing someone’s freedom can be compatible with love (depending on the circumstances). God can, and does, restrict our freedom in various ways, and the manner in which he does this does not violate the concept of a loving relationship. But this fact does not actually refute the free will position that I have been using in this thread, because there are still other ways in which God could curtail our freedom which would be a violation of the requirements of a loving relationship. Likewise, going back to the other aspect of my central idea, there are ways in which God could curtail our freedom that would consequently hamper our ability to be champions of virtue.
Very well. It seems that our opinions are NOT diametrically opposing - which is a good thing. My objection is stated above. Why do we “need” to be able to commit atrocities against each other, when it is perfectly sufficient that we do not obey the First Commandment (“Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all your heart” - approximate quotation)? I say that there is no reason to allow us to do other atrocities. God could deprive all of us from being able to commit any atrocities, and still leave us the freedom to “worship” or “reject” him.
 
Ok. So let God speak for himself, and we shall all listen. But don’t try to wiggle out and say that God “did” speak two thousand years ago. Old stories do not count. Today we have TV, we have the internet, and a captive audience. Until God actually speaks for himself, all we have is opinions - and my opinion is just as valid as yours (neither of them is worth a “dayum” :)).
This is off-topic. This thread was started by a Catholic in regards to her Catholic Faith. I am a Catholic giving Catholic responses. In that regard, “old stories” most certainly count. But if we allow this discussion to go further into the realm of why Catholic beliefs in this matter should be acceptable to an atheist then not only do we go off-topic, but we will be in violation of the temporary ban against atheist-oriented discussions. I am only concerned in demonstrating that Judeo-Christian beliefs embrace the notion of free will, the idea of a benevolent God and the reality of evil, without these beliefs being contradictory to one another. Whether or not a person specifically accepts Judeo-Christian beliefs in general is really not my concern in this thread.
That is what you believe. If God wishes me to accept what you say, he needs to affirm that your belief is accurate. Otherwise it is your word only (MAYBE supported by the CC of course), but I don’t accept it - as you surely know by now.
I’ll keep this in mind if I ever find myself in an atheist forum board trying to convince atheists to believe in what the Catholic Church says about divine revelation. But let me remind you of what I stated back on April 5 in Post #56: “Although I welcome your (name removed by moderator)ut, pardon me by pointing out that I am mostly concerned with whether or not my position is satisfying to sadiebelle, seeing as it is her thread and I am trying to address her concerns. If she finds my (name removed by moderator)ut helpful then that is what I’m shooting for. If she finds it lacking, she is free to address it and I will respond accordingly. It seems like you are trying to highjack this thread into your own personal philosophical debate rather than just start a new thread.”
Possibility is fine - actuality is not. Though it is not really needed. You seem to forget that we must take God’s omnipotence into account.
Actually, I discussed God’s omnipotence at length in Post #20.

But once again the key is discerning the problem of evil according to what God intended to create, not according to what he could have done otherwise based upon a different intention. To sufficiently refute my position in this thread, one needs to propose a world that could feasibly exist which fulfills God’s intentions (according to Judeo-Christian belief) in a way better than this one. Moreover, such propositions cannot be logically contradictory.
To illustrate what I mean, let’s use an example: “suppose God wants us to be very strong, physically, and therefore he puts us into situations when we must exercise our muscles and become physically fit”. But God could select a much better method (and foolproof at that) by creating everyone strong and healthy in the first place, so the “no pain, no gain” method is not necessary. By the same token, God could create everyone a “champion of virtue”, right off the bat. Much simpler method.
A champion is not someone with a high degree of capabilities. A football player may be very strong and physically fit, but he is not considered a champion until he wins a few championship games (indeed, in games that are actually worthy of being given such a distinction – an easy victory doesn’t count even if it was called a championship game). Simply put, if there is no significant struggle then the person who overcomes it can hardly be considered a champion who has achieved a great victory. The “simpler method” you suggest may allow for a capable athlete, but not someone who is automatically a champion. It is the same in the spiritual order of things.

Although I don’t recommend using Hollywood action movies as the basis for theological or philosophical discussions, I couldn’t help but think of Rocky IV during this part of our discussion. In the film the Russians specifically breed a man to be the best possible boxer “right off the bat” (a process which included steroids). As the movie plays out, although he is a powerful boxer, he is not a champion boxer, and loses to one who is (that person being Rocky, of course).

(Continued in my next post…)
 
(Continued…)
So far, so good. I have been told that my lack of belief “counts” as a “rejection” of God. That is perfectly sufficient. God wants everyone to love him (I think “worship” is a better word here). Some of us do not love him - because we do not believe that he exists. Voila! There are the “evil sinners” so he can throw all of us into the eternal fire, where the smell of our burning flesh will resemble to the stench of the burnt offering, so pleasing to the nostrils of the Lord.
It is not perfectly sufficient because God has given you the opportunity to undo this rejection before it is too late. God is an optimist and has given you the gift of time to reconsider the depths of your beliefs. But anyway, this line of discussion is heading into the area of the temporary ban on atheist threads, as I stated above. It is also starting to drift from my own particular stance. My position is that the Catholic belief of a benevolent God and human free will is not logically contradictory to the reality of evil in this world. I have been having a discussion with you in order to defend my position. If you want my explanation to also be a compelling enough argument to convert an atheist to the Catholic Faith then such a thing is way beyond the scope of this thread. Therefore, let us stay focused on examining whether or not my material presents a logical contradiction.
What evil? I chose “evil” by not believing in God. There is absolutely no need for me to be able to commit any other “evil”. Why do I have to be able to commit “other evils”, too? Think about it, please!
In response to this, I direct you to what I said above about God being an optimist.
EricFilmer;7757147:
What I just stated is another reiteration of what I originally presented way back in Post #4. But consider how you attempted to refute my position in the above quote. I never said that the rule of love has to permit unfettered
freedom. Within every loving relationship there needs to be a proper set of boundaries. So yes, I agree with you that curtailing someone’s freedom can be compatible with love (depending on the circumstances). God can, and does, restrict our freedom in various ways, and the manner in which he does this does not violate the concept of a loving relationship. But this fact does not actually refute the free will position that I have been using in this thread, because there are still other ways in which God could curtail our freedom which would be a violation of the requirements of a loving relationship. Likewise, going back to the other aspect of my central idea, there are ways in which God could curtail our freedom that would consequently hamper our ability to be champions of virtue.

Very well. It seems that our opinions are NOT diametrically opposing - which is a good thing.
Yes, it is a very good thing indeed. But why did it take you so long to realize this? I ask you to reread the statement I made above that you responded to, and in particular my discussion on how the rule of love does not have to permit unfettered freedom. And now I ask you to reread what I posted several days ago in Post #54 which I will cut & paste here: “I agree that our freedom is never absolute (nor have I ever indicated otherwise). God, civil authorities, parents, school principals, etc. place boundaries, and whereas these boundaries limit freedom, they do not outright deny all freedom.”
My objection is stated above. Why do we “need” to be able to commit atrocities against each other, when it is perfectly sufficient that we do not obey the First Commandment (“Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all your heart” - approximate quotation)? I say that there is no reason to allow us to do other atrocities. God could deprive all of us from being able to commit any atrocities, and still leave us the freedom to “worship” or “reject” him.
Now we’re just going over old ground. We’ve been through this before, so I will simply respond with something I originally posted back on April 5 (Post #56):

“And how realistic is such a world you envision? How can it be possible to help someone with surgery without it also being possible to use those same methods in a perverse way to inflict torture? How can it be possible to feed people without it also being possible to starve them? How can it be possible to console a crying child who has skinned his knee without it also being possible to ignore him and make him feel neglected and unloved? How can it be possible to give shelter to a family who lost their house in a fire without it also being possible to let them live in the streets? How can it be possible to give a million dollars to charity without it also being possible to keep the money for selfish indulgences? How does God allow all these good examples and at the same time prevent all the bad counterparts unless intervenes in each and every moral situation and prevents a person from doing an evil action. That would be a violation of human freedom.

God created us to not only live virtuous lives, but lives of heroic virtue. The greater the reality of hate, the greater the act of love which overcomes it. The greater the temptation and opportunity to commit gluttony, the greater the act of temperance which overcomes it. And so on and so on. In the current state of affairs in our world, there is the opportunity for people to be true champions of virtue, and moral victories can indeed be victories in every sense of the word. A man may want his teenage son to be a great football player, but if his son only plays football against kindergartners then his successes would hardly be considered “great victories.” God doesn’t just want us to love, but to love powerfully.”
 
It is not perfectly sufficient because God has given you the opportunity to undo this rejection before it is too late.
That does not explain anything - and I have no idea why do you think it does. According to Catholic beliefs I can repent any atrocious act. Here is the point I make:

The only “freedom” we need is to accept of reject God. No other freedom is logically needed. We could be total “robots” or saints in every other respect. We could be compelled and forced to be loving and caring toward each other. As long as we have the freedom of “not loving God”, we have enough freedom.

Yes, the degree of the freedom we “enjoy” is contradictory with a loving God - just like the parent, who allows too much freedom to his child, who does not interfere with his child’s fatal action cannot be considered “loving”. The parent who does not feed his child, who does not cure his child, who throws his child out from his house for one disobedient act cannot be considered “loving”. The parent who does NOT interfere with his child’s fatal actions cannot be considered loving. If a real, human parent would act (or not act) as God does he would be considered a child abuser of the worst kind, he would be despised and hated for his behavior.

The “other” freedoms, which are not logically necessary are the ones that bring your argument down. And I really don’t care if such a state of affairs is considered “realistic” by you. If God is omnipotent, he can arrange it - since it does not contain a logical contradiction. We are contemplating possible states of affairs, and the only logical requirement is that they do not have logical contradictions. From God’s omnipotence it follows that he could create a world, where the only freedom we enjoy is to love or not love God.

Now to respond to your auxiliary assumptions of what God “desires” (virtue etc.). I am objecting to those because they are additional assumptions and have nothing to do with the “free will” problem itself. If you could substantiate them on fully rational, secular grounds, it would be perfectly fine to include them. But you cannot “hide” behind the fact that this is a Catholic site, and any Catholic assumption can be included.

The mutually agreed upon assumptions are:
  1. God is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent
  2. there is “evil” in the world
  3. we have a certain amont of freedom in our actions.
    You cannot include additional characteristics for God - without justifying them, on secular, rational grounds. That would be “moving the goalposts”. The point is that from the three assumptions we arrive at the conclusion that God could have created a different world, where there is still freedom but the only “evil” is the “lack of worshipping God”. Why did he not do it? Does not matter. There would be no excuse for the child-abusing father either. Why did he not stop his son when the son was about to pull the trigger? Who cares? We might care, of course, if the father would come out and explain. Since he does not, and since you assumed the role of the defense lawyer on his behalf, it is up to you to establish his case. But you cannot make unsubstantiated assumptions.
By the way, I think it is time for suggesting a short additional reading for you: The tale of the 12 officers. Your stance is the combination of the first and second officer with a hint of the fourth one. Read it and weep. 🙂
 
If you could substantiate them on fully rational secular grounds, it would be perfectly fine to include them. But you cannot “hide” behind the fact that this is a Catholic site, and any Catholic assumption can be included.
I decided to begin this post by responding to this statement first. As I have said over and over, I have given a free will defense that states that God is benevolent, humans have free will, and that evil is present in our world, and my positions do not logically contradict one another. Moreover, I have discussing this from a Catholic perspective because as far as I am concerned the Catholic perspective is the one that explains the whole truth of the matter being examined.

Way back in Post #4 I outlined my free will position, and one can readily see that it is based upon Catholicism. Moreover, I was a Catholic responding to a Catholic. In Post #18 you chose to enter this discussion in response to my free will position. And yet you are trying to resort to the same old trick that other atheists do on CAF over and over. The trick is this: defend the Catholic concept of God according to an atheist’s definition of a theoretical divine being. Well, sorry dude, but I don’t play that game. If I am going to defend the Catholic concept of God then I will do so within the framework of Catholicism. Therefore, I will be addressing the God who actually exists and not a faulty philosophical notion of one who does not. Trying to compel me to not defend my free will position but rather a different one is a colossal waste of my time and yours!

I just quickly scanned through this thread. I have now stated to you in one way or another that the only free will defense I am going to defend is the one that I presented in this thread (as initially stated in Post #4 and reiterated in Post #74) at least seventeen times! And yet you keep trying to drag me into defending some other free will position. When are you going to accept the fact that it just “ain’t gonna happen”? If you want to discuss the free will defense within a specific set of what you deem to be acceptable parameters then start a thread in the philosophy forum and see who responds.
That does not explain anything - and I have no idea why do you think it does. According to Catholic beliefs I can repent any atrocious act. Here is the point I make:
The only “freedom” we need is to accept of reject God. No other freedom is logically needed. We could be total “robots” or saints in every other respect. We could be compelled and forced to be loving and caring toward each other. As long as we have the freedom of “not loving God”, we have enough freedom.
First of all, your statement is automatically refuted because it does not address what I have said about being champions of virtue. Secondly, I ask you to determine what freedoms are “logically necessary” for the loving relationship between a husband and wife. I imagine that once we narrow down the field as to what a husband and wife should do for one another in terms of what is “logically necessary” it won’t be a relationship really worth having. The same could be said of a relationship between God and people.
Yes, the degree of the freedom we “enjoy” is contradictory with a loving God - just like the parent, who allows too much freedom to his child, who does not interfere with his child’s fatal action cannot be considered “loving”. The parent who does not feed his child, who does not cure his child, who throws his child out from his house for one disobedient act cannot be considered “loving”. The parent who does NOT interfere with his child’s fatal actions cannot be considered loving. If a real, human parent would act (or not act) as God does he would be considered a child abuser of the worst kind, he would be despised and hated for his behavior.
Give me one specific example of an atrocity and explain how you think a benevolent God should have acted. We can take it from there. But just be aware, I will critique your material in light of the free will position I have used in this thread.
The “other” freedoms, which are not logically necessary are the ones that bring your argument down.
Here’s where you are trying to switch the focus. I stated in my last post, “Therefore, let us stay focused on examining whether or not my material presents a logical contradiction.” You haven’t been able to find such a logical contradiction. So instead you are trying to dismiss elements of my position as being “logically unnecessary.” Well, in terms of my free will position they are, indeed, logically necessary, as I have explained in this thread repeatedly.

(Continued in my next post)
 
(Continued…)
And I really don’t care if such a state of affairs is considered “realistic” by you. If God is omnipotent, he can arrange it - since it does not contain a logical contradiction. We are contemplating possible states of affairs, and the only logical requirement is that they do not have logical contradictions. From God’s omnipotence it follows that he could create a world, where the only freedom we enjoy is to love or not love God.
So we are “contemplating possible states of affairs”, so long as those “possible states of affairs” don’t include what Catholicism teaches, huh? I don’t play cards with a stacked deck. God intended to create a world where we are not simply to love God, but to also love one another. God intended to create a world where it is possible to not simply love, but to love powerfully as champions of virtue. Apparently you envision a world where everyone lives in seclusion to one another, make a daily devotional prayer to God, but without the freedom to do much of anything else. Some life.
Now to respond to your auxiliary assumptions of what God “desires” (virtue etc.).
As I said before, I make no assumptions but am simply referring to what God has revealed. I am not here to defend some philosophically theorized divine being but the God known to Judeo-Christianity.
I am objecting to those because they are additional assumptions and have nothing to do with the “free will” problem itself.
Sounds like you are trying to come up with a way to dodge addressing it. They have everything to do with this discussion because it involves what God’s intention was regarding creation and consequently the presence of evil. You’re like a judge who says, “Let’s put someone on trial to examine his behavior, but I don’t want anyone to speak about his motives.” How does that make any sense?
The mutually agreed upon assumptions are:
  1. God is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent
  2. there is “evil” in the world
  3. we have a certain amont of freedom in our actions.
    You cannot include additional characteristics for God - without justifying them, on secular, rational grounds. That would be “moving the goalposts”.
Oh, so I am “moving the goal posts”, am I? Like I said before, I am examining God’s intentions, his motives. I have given you a free will position in this thread that makes sense, but you are unwilling to admit it. So instead you want me to throw out the parts of my position that you are having the hardest time trying to refute. No way, pal. As I have stated over and over, I am here to defend my free will position, and I am not going to start chopping off pieces of it because you decide that for some reason we can only argue within the framework of a handful of “mutually agreed assumptions.” This is now at least the eighteenth time that I have had to point this out.
The point is that from the three assumptions we arrive at the conclusion that God could have created a different world, where there is still freedom but the only “evil” is the “lack of worshipping God”. Why did he not do it? Does not matter. There would be no excuse for the child-abusing father either. Why did he not stop his son when the son was about to pull the trigger? Who cares? We might care, of course, if the father would come out and explain. Since he does not, and since you assumed the role of the defense lawyer on his behalf, it is up to you to establish his case. But you cannot make unsubstantiated assumptions.
Here we go again. As far as you are concerned, I am the “defense lawyer” but I am not permitted to speak about my client’s motives. Looks like in order to convict God you want to use an unfair trial. And I do not make “unsubstantiated assumptions” but rather present what God has revealed.

(Continued in my next post)
 
(Continued…)
By the way, I think it is time for suggesting a short additional reading for you: The tale of the 12 officers. Your stance is the combination of the first and second officer with a hint of the fourth one. Read it and weep. 🙂
I’ve been down this sort of road before. There are people who are unable to refute my positions so they start throwing out links to websites that they hope can do the job. Then I end up wasting time reading stuff that is not actually relevant to my position. Therefore, these are the guidelines I set down.
  1. Link the website.
  2. In this thread present the material from that thread that you believe is relevant.
  3. Explain exactly how that material is similar enough to my own material to warrant its inclusion in the ongoing discussion.
  4. Clearly, demonstrate how the presented material refutes my position.
In the case at hand, instead of simply saying “Your stance is the combination of the first and second officer with a hint of the forth one,” explain in this thread what those stances are, and also explain why those positions encompass mine. For the record, I went ahead and read the article and can tell you that, no, they do not encompass the position I set down in Post #4. But seeing as you are the one who brought this up, rather than me spending the time to state why they don’t, you can spend the time stating why you think they do.

I will, however, take the time to point out the major flaw in that entire website you posted. First of all, it presumes that God does not outright stop evil. According to Judeo-Christianity, God does outright stop evil on occasion. At other times he permits evil to happen. But the responsibility of God is not to outright stop evil, but to ultimately do something about it. The person who formulated the website you linked is basically saying that if a benevolent God exists, he has a moral obligation to stop all evil from happening everywhere, at all times. After all, that is the ramification of his criticisms. And, course, that means that God has to violate our free will (which is also a violation of love) and prevent us from being champions of virtue. I dare say, by now you should have seen that one coming.
 
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