D
danserr
Guest
The first issue you raise is easily answered. Trying to dismiss it as a numbers game does not work. Of course it is better to have more people saved and in heaven with God than fewer, can you seriously deny that?
How do you know their is no limit to such people? It may be that no possible world exists in which all people freely choose good, without that possible world having some significant drawbacks. Number of people is one possible example; there could be others. It seems that you are taking on a very difficult burden of proof if you are claiming that there is a possible world with no drawbacks where all creatures freely choose good. By contrast for the free will defense to work, all it only has to be possible that there are no feasible worlds God can create with creatures that always freely choose good.
Are you familiar with Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity? It seems to have some relation to the determinism/compatibilism issue.
This gets into issues of determinism and compatibility. You seem to take a compatibliist view and argue that determinism is compatible with free will. I am inclined to follow the philosopher Van Inwagen see determinism as incompatible with free will. If my actions can be accounted for by causal factors outside myself, (ie, if my not doing evil can be fully accounted for by God making me unable to do evil), then it is very hard to see how I can be free.
A possible world refers to broadly logically possible, when I talk about it not being feasible for God to create people with free will who never sin, I mean that such a scenario may (or may not) be broadly logically possible, but it might have drawbacks that would explain why God does not create such a world.And since there is no logical contradiction between having “free will” without actual “evil”, and there is no upper limit to the number of people in such a world, God can actualize (or instantiate) such a world.
How do you know their is no limit to such people? It may be that no possible world exists in which all people freely choose good, without that possible world having some significant drawbacks. Number of people is one possible example; there could be others. It seems that you are taking on a very difficult burden of proof if you are claiming that there is a possible world with no drawbacks where all creatures freely choose good. By contrast for the free will defense to work, all it only has to be possible that there are no feasible worlds God can create with creatures that always freely choose good.
Are you familiar with Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity? It seems to have some relation to the determinism/compatibilism issue.
No. If God creates people free but unable to sin; then they are unable to sin because he made them that way. That is to say, their actions are compelled or limited by a force outside themselves. In which case they are not free.If God would instill a proper disposition in every human being, he would not “force” anyone, but he would “nudge” everyone. Do you see the difference?
This gets into issues of determinism and compatibility. You seem to take a compatibliist view and argue that determinism is compatible with free will. I am inclined to follow the philosopher Van Inwagen see determinism as incompatible with free will. If my actions can be accounted for by causal factors outside myself, (ie, if my not doing evil can be fully accounted for by God making me unable to do evil), then it is very hard to see how I can be free.