They need close relationships, and there are certain societal advantages to recognizing such relationships legally. This isn’t about sex.
Precisely. Marriage necessarily includes at least the possibility of sexual intercourse, but the kind of legal structure you’re proposing is not condemned by the Church because - unlike with gay civil unions - there’s no equivocation whatsoever: it wouldn’t even be about sexual activity.
What we need to do is to take the civil union debate out of the context of the sexuality debate altogether … The best way to preserve this is to create a broad category of civil unions that does not have anything necessarily to do with sexuality.
I couldn’t have said it better myself, Contarini.
As it stands, many people find the Church’s position cruel and immoral because the genuine human needs of people who cannot get married are being rejected along with the disordered sexual inclinations of the largest and most vocal group of such people.
Yes, this point of yours is, I think, of critical importance and merits consideration by our society at large.
But it’s not clear that the Vatican has even considered the line of argument I’m suggesting.
You’re right; I don’t believe they have. In fact, though, Princeton professor Robert George essentially agrees with your assessment in
this academic paper he wrote not too long ago.
Contarini, you are deeply intelligent, thoughtful, and compassionate (judging from this and other threads, too). I wish so much that more people - especially Christians - in this world thought and expressed themselves like you do.
Thank you for proving my point. You have just stated that the best way to give homosexual couples a marriage equivalent is to shift the argument to a “broad category of civil unions.”
No, you’re wrong. The above quote’s response is guilty of ham-fisted equivocation: Contarini has
not advocated “civil unions” in the sense in which you’re taking them: as a recognition of a same-sex sexual relationship that apes marriage in other characteristics such as monogamy, fidelity, etc.
Rather, he’s talking about the construction of a legal category that would in
no way be based on sex or sexual activity of any kind, nor on monogamy, nor even necessarily on other aspects we associate with marriage. What they
would include would be some of the same benefits that we now reserve to married partners, but this
can be done in a way that does not implicitly condone sexual immorality.
Indeed, if a society wishes to recognize homosexual marriage as equivalent to heterosexual marriage, there is no reason whatever not to extend the same benefits to any persons wishing to obtain the benefits of marriage for their particular variety of union–polygamists, polyandrists, non-sexual unions such as business partners, mother-daughter, mother-son, or other family member groupings. Those living in a commune might wish to all enjoy the benefits of group marriage.
That is very true, but it actually supports Contarini’s point: it is
precisely the heart of the matter that such a legal category need
not base itself on sexual activity or mimic any of the attributes of marriage.