Well, I am first of all saying that the fact that someone presenting a proof believes what he is proving already does not give us reason to believe that it is just for what he has “a propensity to believe as distinct from know” (italics added).
What else could it be? In fact, we only think we know. Thought trains give the illusion of knowing. Some of those thought trains correspond with actuality closely enough to make for survival. Ultimately, there is only one thing that can be actually known. Logics are constructs that fit together, but usually, especially on here, only one or two valued logics are used. And for the most part, logics only work for the measurable or quantifiable component of our experience.
The other point I am making is that this is by no means specific to theism, and it is not just theistic arguments are are of the sort you are describing (ie. people defending them believe their conclusions already). This is typical in philosophy. (Though it might also be noted that in the case of something like Aquinas’s First Way, there are definite antecedents in Aristotle, who did not have Christian theological motivations.)
But why would anyone make christianism or any religion a special case? Just because you believe it? Are the thought processes different when one is looking at their sacred beliefs, whether religious, political, financial or emotional? It is, in fact, how most proceed: they believe something, and if challenged rationalize it. As Mr. Clemens said, “Man is a rationalizing animal.” The prime directive of the brain is to make the imagined thinker right.
The inconsistency I saw would be (contingent on you not being a nihilist; if you are a nihilist and doubt virtually all philosophical proof, then there would not be an inconsistency; the “probably” was meant to avoid presuming whether or not you were a nihilist) to suppose that there is anything lacking in theistic arguments compared to other philosophical arguments.
I am absolutely not a nihilist. And there is an a priori fundamental lack in theistic arguments: Since English and language in general has word referents, there is no tangible common referent for the word “god” and therefor it is a semantically null placeholder argued into existence by belief, similarly to fiat money. We get along fine with fiat money, but we know that ultimately it is a fiction capable of inflation or deflation. That applies to any premise that is conceptual in nature if it has no measurable common referent.
Probably none. The question is: what is the point?
Then what is the usefulness of belief? Especially in an imagined, anthropomorphized deity? Or anything? It seems to me that belief is the death of curiosity and useful inquiry. It is an emotional safe zine of conviction that staves of the potential horror of the Unknown, where an actual answer might be. Belief, while it might be useful as a survival mode for a child, is ultimately a defense against engagement with actuality.
Although, mathematical proofs can be pretty abstruse. I could devise two proofs for the same proposition, one valid and the other invalid, and a large chunk of the population could not tell them apart. The conclusion might be true, but for the invalid proof it is not certain. And its convincingness in such a case is a function of one’s trust that one won’t be shown a faulty proof.
Yes, but what are the foundations of that trust? A child trusts it’s parents necessarily. Hence the passing on of belief systems of many sorts. Because “I grew up with it” doesn’t mean it is exempt from even painful scrutiny and dissection. Hence we have the beliefs of the fathers visiting unto the seventh generation.
Haven’t seen a lot of this, though I certainly wouldn’t claim that most people on this forum consistently provide compelling arguments for God’s existence.
Exactly my point. I haven’t seen one yet. And as you might tell, I’m no holder with atheism either.
This is what I mean by “philosophical nihilism,” ie. a doubt that the philosophical enterprise can return sound results.
As distinct from religion, at least in my view, philosophy is a method of inquiry and can lead to meaning by means of teleology. It is, at least, an activity that is, as it’s root derivation implies, “a love of wisdom.” It is an active looking. Religion, as
its root implies, is “a tying back to.” In other words, it implies something like a living sapling being tied to a rigid stake. And churches have stakes because as memes they have a sort of life of their own which are felt to be defensible and worthy of procreating. For my part, I changed from being a religionist to being a philosopher due to a sudden and shocking change in my life.
People give up cherished beliefs for a number of reasons. It usually doesn’t directly have to do with arguments. But fewer people would, for example, convert to Christianity if they did not believe that there were some possibly sound arguments for it. The arguments might make it a “live option,” so to speak.
Well yes, as I said above. But there are kinds and degrees of stresses that make one look. Switching, say from one christianist sect to another for greater comfort with beliefs may not be as profound as someone having a profound metaphysical experience not accounted for by their faith.
A pleasure chatting with you!
