Problems with free will, possibility, and causality

[davidv]

A free decision is one that is not necessitated by external factors. It is a logical property of free will.

So what are examples of a free decision and a not free decision?

I am not getting the connection to the OP.

 

[blase6]

So what are examples of a free decision and a not free decision?

I am not getting the connection to the OP.

A free decision:
I am motivated to either do X or do Y in a given situation. I am not compelled to choose either.

A not free decision:
In the same decision, I am compelled to do X, because X appears to be the best option, so I will not choose Y.

 

[Bahman]

A free decision:
I am motivated to either do X or do Y in a given situation. I am not compelled to choose either.

A not free decision:
In the same decision, I am compelled to do X, because X appears to be the best option, so I will not choose Y.

Hence doubt exist. How doubt could exit in a causal word as you accepted it?

 

[davidv]

A free decision:
I am motivated to either do X or do Y in a given situation. I am not compelled to choose either.

A not free decision:
In the same decision, I am compelled to do X, because X appears to be the best option, so I will not choose Y.

I believe every moral decision is of the first type. No one is compelled to do either the good or the bad.

Do you have an example of the of a not free decision, because I am not aware of any?

 

[Bahman]

I believe every moral decision is of the first type. No one is compelled to do either the good or the bad.

Do you have an example of the of a not free decision, because I am not aware of any?

Have you ever doubt?

 

[blase6]

I believe every moral decision is of the first type. No one is compelled to do either the good or the bad.

Do you have an example of the of a not free decision, because I am not aware of any?

A not free decision:

You are compelled, in a given situation, to choose X and not Y, because your disposition predetermined your action.

 

[davidv]

Have you ever doubt?

And this matters how?

By the way, I am still waiting for an example of a non free decision so I can understand you meaning.

 

[davidv]

A not free decision:

You are compelled, in a given situation, to choose X and not Y, because your disposition predetermined your action.

Like what, for instance?

 

[blase6]

Like what, for instance?

In a deterministic world, the outcome is necessitated by the precedent situation.

For example, if you are offered wine at a party, and the desire to take it is stronger than the desire to not take it, then you must necessarily take it.

 

[lmelahn]

Because something being done “on purpose” only means that it is done with the consent of the will. If the will is either predetermined by which motive will appear best, or just chooses randomly, then it cannot be free. If the will makes random decisions, then there is still the element of being “predetermined” by chance, or luck.

Right. I am specifically affirming that the will is not (fully) predetermined by the motive that appears best. It can refuse that best motive. Herein lies our freedom.*

I am also saying that the will does not make “random” decisions. Whenever there is randomness, it comes from a factor external to the will (e.g., emotions, passions, bodily injury, or what have you). I can’t make a random decision, for the simple reason that I first have to know and find attractive whatever it is that I am willing.

I can make these affirmations, because they simply recognize what is evident from our everyday experience.

• Of course, choosing badly actually diminishes our freedom, although it does not remove it altogether.

 

[Bahman]

And this matters how?

By the way, I am still waiting for an example of a non free decision so I can understand you meaning.

Doubt cannot exist in a causal universe hence the existence of doubt ensure that we can make free decision. We do a lots of non free action when we do things without paying attention.

 

[blase6]

Right. I am specifically affirming that the will is not (fully) predetermined by the motive that appears best. It can refuse that best motive. Herein lies our freedom.*

I am also saying that the will does not make “random” decisions. Whenever there is randomness, it comes from a factor external to the will (e.g., emotions, passions, bodily injury, or what have you). I can’t make a random decision, for the simple reason that I first have to know and find attractive whatever it is that I am willing.

I can make these affirmations, because they simply recognize what is evident from our everyday experience.

• Of course, choosing badly actually diminishes our freedom, although it does not remove it altogether.

I already said that to refuse a motive would require a motive to refuse it. You cannot act opposed to all motives.

 

[tdgesq]

I already said that to refuse a motive would require a motive to refuse it. You cannot act opposed to all motives.

Since a motive is a reason for doing something, it would seem that there must always be a motive for a free action. Otherwise, it would motiveless and reason-less, which is antithetical to free will. Yet that a motive exists doesn’t entail that our motives (reasons) and subsequent actions are predetermined. No matter how many times you recast your arguments, it always regresses back to the question: what is the locus of causal control for things like motives, reasons and human actions?

If God (who is the ultimate voluntary cause) can create other voluntary causes, such as the human intellect and will, then the locus of causal control can exist in human beings. Is there some reason to believe that God cannot or would not create human beings as voluntary causes where the locus of causal control resides with the human actor?

 

[blase6]

Since a motive is a reason for doing something, it would seem that there must always be a motive for a free action. Otherwise, it would motiveless and reason-less, which is antithetical to free will. Yet that a motive exists doesn’t entail that our motives (reasons) and subsequent actions are predetermined. No matter how many times you recast your arguments, it always regresses back to the question: what is the locus of causal control for things like motives, reasons and human actions?

If God (who is the ultimate voluntary cause) can create other voluntary causes, such as the human intellect and will, then the locus of causal control can exist in human beings. Is there some reason to believe that God cannot or would not create human beings as voluntary causes where the locus of causal control resides with the human actor?

First of all, for this purpose, a motive and reason is the same. Human actions obviously result from whichever motive had the overriding influence.

Second of all, a “voluntary will” is a circular description.

As I see it, the “locus of causal control” must necessarily lie within God alone. If a created person had their own locus, they would be elevated to the determinant power of God, and that would contradict the uniqueness of God. Even assuming that God has free will, I don’t see how a created person can have causal control. It simply does not work in a deterministic world.

 

[lmelahn]

I already said that to refuse a motive would require a motive to refuse it. You cannot act opposed to all motives.

Hm. I don’t think that is exactly correct.

Remember, only good things (or at least the apparent good in things) can be a motivation. Thus, refusing something (which is not a good as such) does not require a contrary motivation. Rather, it is sufficient that the good thing that the will desires not be so compelling as to attract the will inexorably.

 

[davidv]

In a deterministic world, the outcome is necessitated by the precedent situation.

For example, if you are offered wine at a party, and the desire to take it is stronger than the desire to not take it, then you must necessarily take it.

Being in that exact situation, I can tell you that I was not necessitated in taking it. Your will is always stronger than your desires, assuming you call on God’s grace.

 

[blase6]

Being in that exact situation, I can tell you that I was not necessitated in taking it. Your will is always stronger than your desires, assuming you call on God’s grace.

Your will is dependent upon your desires. They are the same as motives.

 

[davidv]

Your will is dependent upon your desires.

Really? How do you know?

They are the same as motives.

So? These are just some of the (name removed by moderator)uts that the intellect and the will consider. They are not settings on a machine that determine it’s speed.

 

[blase6]

Really? How do you know?

All willful actions must derive from motives/desires. To reject this is wholly irrational. Not even God can act without a motive.

So? These are just some of the (name removed by moderator)uts that the intellect and the will consider. They are not settings on a machine that determine it’s speed.

See above.

 

[davidv]

All willful actions must derive from motives/desires. To reject this is wholly irrational. Not even God can act without a motive.

Repeating a claim does not make it so. Please defend yourself. I don’t accept the above as a true statement.

Also, can you speak for God now?

See above

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